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Recent literature on the law and economics of antitrust has devoted
increasing attention to the issue of "predatory pricing"-a dominant
firm's use of price to restrict competition by driving out existing
rivals or excluding potential ones. A number of scholars-including
Areeda and Turner, Baumol, Bork, Posner, Scherer, and William-
son-have contributed to this discussion,' and each has taken a different
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1. The current discussion began with proposals made by Professors Phillip Areeda andDonald Turner in the mid-1970s. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and RelatedPractices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Areeda-Turner Proposal]. A year later, Professor Frederick Scherer commented
on the Areeda-Turner contribution and made proposals of his own. See Scherer, PredatoryPricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Scherer Proposal]. A debate between Areeda and Turner and Scherer ensued. SeeAreeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REv. 891 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Areeda ir Turner on Scherer]; Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory
Pricing, 89 HARv. L. REv. 901 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Scherer Response]. A year later,Professor Oliver Williamson introduced an analysis that led him to a new substantiveproposal. See Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williamson Proposal]. Williamson also engaged in adebate with Areeda and Turner. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory
Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner on Williamson];
Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Williamson Response]. Most recently, Professor William Baumol has proposed
another approach to predatory pricing. See Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduc-
tions: A Policy For Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).Aside from these four proposals, several other positions are evident in the literature.
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approach to the predatory pricing problem. A variety of different
"rules" have been suggested, and these suggestions have played key
roles in the decision of recent Sherman Act and Federal Trade Com-
mission Act cases.2 Although each author discusses the approaches of
writers who have preceded him and although the opinions in the
cases have compared the various approaches, no unified structure has
been provided for evaluating the alternative approaches and choosing
among them.
It is not always clear from the discussions in the respective contri-
butions exactly why the several authors have been led to different
conclusions. In fact a variety of factors seem to account for the di-
vergent positions at which they arrive. First, the various commenta-
tors rely on alternative theoretical models. 3 Some of them use a static
framework 4 to examine firm behavior, while others concentrate on
See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-55 (1978) (suggesting predatory price
cutting is unlikely to exist and any rule prohibiting it is likely to harm consumers more
than the absence of any legal sanction); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 188, 191 (1976) (suggesting that predatory pricing is most usefully defined as "pricing
at a level calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient competitor"
and suggesting as a safeguard that plaintiff be required to show relevant market has
characteristics-many purchasers, or defendant operating in more markets than competi-
tors or potential entrants-predisposing it to effective predatory pricing) [hereinafter cited
as POSNER BOOK].
Finally, attention has been given to predatory pricing in general works on antitrust
law and policy. See, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711722 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE]; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 939-44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Posner Article).
2. See, e.g., Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (applying Areeda-Turner rules in Sherman Act § 2 case); Interna-
tional Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-26 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (applying Areeda-Turner rules in predatory pricing
case brought under Robinson-Patman Act); Borden, Inc., [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,490 (FTC cease and desist order with multiple opinions discussing and applying
various rules from predatory pricing literature).
3. Professor Richard Schmalensee has pointed out that often a multitude of economic
models can provide potential frameworks for analysis of any particular issue in an anti-
trust case. See Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon
Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994, 995-97 (1979). He notes that choosing among models may be
difficult:
Because the literature contains a host of internally coherent models with different
assumptions and implications, and because the methods of economic analysis can be
used to construct new models, analysis of any particular industry or behavior pattern
may pose difficult problems of model selection. Often such problems can only be
dealt with satisfactorily by creative theoretical analysis, along with careful organiza.
tion and evaluation of available evidence.
Id. at 996. Professor Schmalensee illustrates the importance of model selection by examin-
ing how some economic issues were treated in the Federal Trade Commission's Initial
Decision of Borden, Inc., [1976] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,194, modified, [1978]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490. See Schmalensee, supra, at 998-1043.
4. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 149-52; Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at
703-20. Static analysis examines the behavior of economic agents at a single moment.
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strategic aspects in a dynamic context. 5 Some authors, in discussing
social goals, focus on short-run social welfare maximization," while
others are more explicitly concerned with long-run social welfare
maximization.7
Second, the different policy conclusions are at least partially the
result of different empirical guesses about market characteristics.
Consider two examples: first, if one believes that predatory pricing
is a rare event, he will be led to a very different policy recommenda-
tion than will someone who believes it is a much more common oc-
currence; second, if one believes that dominant firms frequently pro-
duce under conditions of excess capacity, rather than at or above the
level for which their plants are best-suited, he will be led to a policy
decision that is quite different from the conclusion derived from the
opposite empirical guess.8
A third factor is the commentator's views of the ease with which
legal controls on price or output can be administered. Although al-
5. See, e.g., Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at 871-75 (use of preemptive entry deter-
rence in form of output expansion by dominant firm); Williamson Proposal, supra note
1, at 292-302 (establishing dynamic, strategic framework of analysis). Dynamic analysis
focusing on strategic behavior examines the incentives and behavior of economic agents
who take into account the intertemporal effects of their actions.
An example of strategic behavior in a multi-period context is "dynamic limit pricing."
See Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN.
THEORY 306 (1971). A dominant firm pursuing a dynamic limit pricing strategy sets price
in each period below the level that would maximize profits in that period but at a level
that will serve to maximize long-run discounted profits. (For an explanation of discount-
ing, see note 30 infra.) Setting each period's price at its short-run profit-maximizing level
generally will not maximize long-run profits because the entry induced by high current
prices will erode the dominant firm's market power and its ability to charge supranormal
prices in later periods. For a detailed discussion of various forms of limit pricing behavior,
see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 219-30 (1970).
6. See Areeda & Turner on Scherer, supra note 1, at 896-97 (defending focus of original
Areeda-Turner proposal on short-run welfare maximization: "long-run possibilities must
be disregarded because they are intrinsically speculative and indeterminate. No suitable
administrable rules could be formulated to give them recognition."). Short-run welfare
maximization focuses on current welfare gains and losses and does not take into account
those that will occur in the future.
7. See, e.g., Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at 883-86 (arguing that long-run rather
than short-run welfare maximization is proper criterion); Williamson Proposal, supra
note 1, at 306-10 (examining welfare effects both before and after entry). Long-run wel-
fare maximization considers both present and future welfare gains and losses.
8. A commentator's judgment about how likely or unlikely it is for a dominant firm
to be operating above its optimal scale and to be charging a price somewhere between its
average cost and its marginal cost is also crucial for the kind of policy recommendation
that is made. Compare Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at 705 n.22 (case where
price equals or exceeds average cost but is less than marginal cost is "unusual") with
Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at 872-73 (production at above optimal scale with price
greater than average cost but less than marginal cost may deter entry and yet pass
Areeda & Turner's "price greater than average variable cost" test; this situation is "more
apt to occur in the real world than the 'excess capacity' case" that Areeda & Turner con-
sider "more typical and more important").
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most all of the contributors to the recent literature voice dismay at
the prospect of instituting anything that resembles public-utility regu-
lation for dominant firms, they hold substantially different views of
the degree of control that is feasible within the current framework
of antitrust institutions.9
Fourth, the writers differ on the question of institutional com-
petence; different authors have different conceptions about what
courts can do well, 10 what kinds of information they can process, and
what issues are "too speculative" for judges or juries to decide." Of
course, similar questions can be raised about the capability of ad-
ministrative agencies.
Fifth, in framing a policy or an approach, different authors at-
tach different weights to the importance of having a simple per se
rule instead of a rule-of-reason approach. A per se rule not only limits
the complexity of case-by-case inquiry and analysis, but also is sup-
posed to generate accurate and consistent results when applied by
judges and juries. As a result, it is argued that a simple per se rule
gives clear signals to firms as to what constitutes legal pricing be-
havior and what does not.' 2 On the other hand, a detailed case-by-
case analysis associated with a rule-of-reason approach permits con-
sideration of the variety of specific structural and behavioral aspects
of the particular dominant firm's situation that are relevant to a
determination of whether the firm was violating the antitrust laws.'
3
The rule-of-reason approach, its proponents would argue, allows the
decisionmaker to go beyond loose language and mechanical rules to the
specific conduct of the dominant firm and the implications of that
9. Compare Scherer Response, supra note 1, at 902-03 (Scherer proposal would not be
too complex for courts to use; companies have good grasp on required data and costs of
obtaining it would be comparable with other antitrust cases) with R. BORK, supra note
1, at 154-55 (items on Scherer's list for consideration "that would not be altered by the
monopolist's knowledge of the rules are unknowable by either courts or economists;" list
is not "fit for judicial employment") and Areeda & Turner on Scherer, supra note 1, at
897 (given Scherer's "formidable list of the relevant variables" there is "no realistic way"
that courts could make findings required by Scherer proposal) and Williamson Proposal,
supra note 1, at 288 n.16 (agreeing with Areeda & Turner criticism of Scherer on institu-
tional feasibility).
10. See note 9 supra. Compare Areeda 6 Turner on Williamson, supra note 1, at
1345-50 (Williamson proposal would be harder for courts to enforce than Areeda-Turner
proposal) with Williamson Response, supra note 1, at 1191-97 (Areeda-Turner proposal
would be harder for courts to enforce than Williamson proposal).
11. See notes 6 & 9 supra.
12. See Areeda & Turner on Scherer, supra note 1, at 897; cf. Areeda & Turner on
Williamson, supra note 1, at 1351 (because proving predatory pricing or its absence is
difficult, "relatively arbitrary rules are necessary to minimize administrative difficulties").
13. See Scherer Response, supra note 1, at 902-03; Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at
890.
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conduct for economic efficiency and other goals of antitrust law.14
A related factor that may lead to differing conclusions, and the
last one we will mention here, is the degree of concern about the liti-
giousness of market participants. Some commentators are very con-
cerned about the use of private treble damage suits against alleged
predators when such suits are of dubious merit. Others, while worried
about such suits, are also concerned about how dominant firms will re-
spond to particular predatory pricing rules in an attempt to avoid
litigation.' 5
This list of possible reasons for different policy recommendations
with regard to predatory pricing is not exhaustive. It is clear that a
large number of diverse factors play a part in the presentation of
the several policy conclusions, and thus it seems important to de-
velop a comprehensive framework for comparing and evaluating al-
ternative approaches to the predatory pricing problem. Each of the
factors we have just noted as relevant is incorporated in the decision-
theoretic' 6 framework developed here. The analytical structure we
suggest will make clearer exactly how these various factors and judg-
ments enter into the formulation of a policy toward predatory pricing.
Furthermore, it will be apparent as we proceed that this structure also
provides a framework for evaluating alternative rules in other areas of
antitrust.
In designing a policy toward predatory pricing, one is confronted
with the difficult task of inferring long-run market outcomes from
observable short-run behavior and short-run market conditions. Any
such inference entails uncertainty and hence the possibility of error;
an assessment of long-run considerations is necessarily "speculative
and indeterminate."' 17 Nevertheless, such an assessment is required be-
cause the essence of predatory pricing is the alleged predator's sacrifice
of short-run gains for greater long-run gains.
Consider a particular market, and suppose that we are trying to
14. See Borden, Inc., [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490, at 21,518, 21,523 (Pitof-
sky, Comm'r, concurring).
15. See Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at 883 (Areeda-Turner rules will encourage
dominant firms to hold costly excess capacity); Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at
295-302 (describing responses of dominant firm to various rules).
16. Decision theory is concerned with making optimal decisions when various aspects
of the world are uncertain. See, e.g., M. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS (1970)
(advanced treatment); H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968) (elementary treatment). The
specific application of decision theory in this article is presented at pp. 218-19 infra.
17. Areeda &Y Turner on Scherer, supra note 1, at 897. At least one court has agreed
with Areeda & Turner and has chosen to ignore long-run considerations in light of the
"limitations of the judicial process." Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d
848, 857 n.9 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
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select a rule that takes long-run considerations into account and that
can be applied if and when a charge of predatory pricing is leveled
against a firm in this market. The evaluative structure we develop
indicates that for each proposed predatory pricing rule one should
consider, for this market, the probability of each kind of error"'
the rule can lead to, the cost of each kind of error, and the cost of
implementing the policy.
Our decision-theoretic framework directs that we choose the policy
that would minimize the sum of the expected costs of error and the
costs of implementation that would result if the policy were ap-
plied to the market we are considering. If all markets were identical
in their structural and behavioral aspects, then having found the op-
timal predatory pricing rule for one market, we could apply it with
confidence to all others. But, as one might expect, different markets
are not identical with respect to the features that determine the sum
of the expected error costs and the costs of implementation for alter-
native rules. Hence, our decision-theoretic evaluative mechanism re-
veals that no single rule will be best for all market situations; if a
predatory pricing rule is formulated with one particular market in
mind, we cannot be sure that it should be applied to other market
situations.
What is needed is an approach that can accommodate important
market differences: the characteristics of firms and markets that af-
fect the probabilities of error, the error costs, and the implementation
costs of alternative policy approaches. We will demonstrate how con-
sideration of the links between certain firm and market characteris-
tics, on the one hand, and the probabilities of error, error costs, and
rule-implementation costs, on the other, can be used to develop a
two-tiered "structuralist" rule-of-reason approach to be applied in
cases of alleged predatory pricing behavior.
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be emphasized that we are
using a decision-theoretic framework as an analytical device for eval-
uating alternative standards or approaches, under the assumption
that each standard or approach evaluated would be applied uniform-
ly to all cases. We are not suggesting that a judge or a jury should go
through our evaluative calculus in deciding a particular case. Rather,
our examination of alternative policies, and our use of the decision-
theoretic framework to evaluate their respective expected performance,
leads us to suggest a particular approach to predatory pricing that
18. See pp. 223-24 infra (distinguishing the types of errors a rule can generate).
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most appropriately accounts for uncertainty and the costs of making
incorrect decisions, ex ante. The two-stage rule-of-reason approach
we suggest would then be applied uniformly on a case-by-case basis.' 9
I. Identification of the Predatory Pricing Problem
Although there is a substantial and growing literature and case
law on predatory pricing, no definition of predatory pricing seems
to have commanded the assent of all concerned. 20 It is fair to say,
however, that "predatory pricing" is generally used to describe the
adoption of a pricing policy that somehow restricts competition by
driving out existing rivals or by excluding potential rivals from the
market.21 The differences in usage arise when this general idea is
given specific content.
A. Definition of Predatory Pricing
We shall use the following rather simple definition: Predatory
pricing behavior involves a reduction of price in the short run so
as to drive competing firms out of the market or to discourage entry
of new firms in an effort to gain larger profits via higher prices in
19. We are taking a "meta-rule-of-reason" approach to the evaluation of alternative
per se rules for predatory pricing cases. Our examination of the expected performance of
these per se rules leads us to argue that no one of them should be adopted as the rule
for a judge or jury to apply in any particular case. Instead, we will argue that the best
way to decide a specific predatory pricing case is by applying a rule of reason, as that is
traditionally understood in antitrust law. We will suggest a two-stage structuralist ap-
proach as a particular way of organizing a rule-of-reason inquiry in predatory pricing
cases.
20. Both courts and commentators have noted that there is no accepted definition of
predatory pricing or of attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act. See,
e.g., Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795-96 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (no definitive standard defining predatory pricing exists
in federal law); NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REvIE OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 144-45 (1979) (scope of Sherman
Act § 2 attempted monopolization offense not well-defined) [hereinafter cited as ANTI-
TRUST COaMMssIoN REPORT]. Indeed, one economist who has contributed to the predatory
pricing discussion has stated that:
An attempt to provide a universally acceptable definition for a vague term such as
"predatory pricing" probably can contribute little. However, the term does relate
to a problem that is real and significant-the design of means to permit full and
fair competitive measures by the established firm, without foreclosure of entry.
Baumol, supra note 1, at 26 (footnote omitted).
21. See, e.g., Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at 697 (predatory pricing exists
when there are sales at "unremunerative prices"). At least one court has adopted the
Areeda-Turner characterization. See Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d
848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). After utilizing the "unremunera-
tive pricing" characterization, the Janich court went on to say that "[p]ricing is predatory
only where the firm foregoes short-term profits in order to develop a market position
such that the firm can later raise prices and recoup lost profits." Id. at 856.
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the long run than would have been earned if the price reduction had
not occurred. 22
The predator expects that its entry-impeding, exit-inducing strategy
will enable it either eventually to raise prices or to maintain an ex-
isting market structure in which prices are above competitive levels
for a longer period of time than would be possible if entry were
allowed to occur immediately. In either case, the firm pursuing such
a strategy does so in the expectation that long-run profits will in-
crease more than enough to compensate for what has been sacrificed
in the short run. Predatory pricing behavior, as defined here, may
or may not entail actual short-run economic losses for the alleged
predator; it almost always imposes short-run losses on some or all
of the firm's existing competitors.
23
B. The Goals of Antitrust Law
The primary objective of antitrust policy is to promote full and
fair market competition and to reap the benefits that competition
brings with it.24 Stated in negative terms, the goal is to discourage
22. The definition utilized in this article is similar to that adopted by the Ninth
Circuit. See Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
23. We might note that there is another version of predatory pricing that may have
the same long-run effects on prices and profits but is not calculated to drive other firms
from the market or to deter potential entrants. It involves the dominant firm's use of
pricing policy to enforce price and market-share controls through "market signals" rather
than through more direct collusive devices. Specifically, in a market where there is a
dominant firm and a few small fringe firms, the dominant enterprise may use changes
in its price to discipline the other firms. The goal is to discourage the fringe firms from
breaking effective oligopolistic coordination by reducing prices or trying to draw cus-
tomers away from the dominant firm. The larger firm, while not necessarily driving the
small firms from the market, demonstrates that it can and will inflict serious losses if it
chooses to do so. This credible threat is intended to encourage the fringe firms to "toe
the line" and follow the dominant firm's supra-competitive pricing policy. Fringe firms
may not be forced out of the market but they are effectively given the choice of remain-
ing small and supporting the dominant firm's pricing policy or being forced to leave.
See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 144.
24. There is, of course, a diversity of views about what the objectives of antitrust policy
ought to be and what relative weight economic and noneconomic considerations should
be given in designing antitrust policy. In the view of some commentators, economic ef-
ficiency should be the only objective of antitrust law. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note I, at
7-8; POSNER BooK, suPra note I, at 4, 8-22. Others argue that noneconomic considerations
and political values are also relevant and important to the interpretation and enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Scherer, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 980-81 (1977) (reviewing
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE). Professor Scherer's extensive
writings in industrial organization and antitrust leave no doubt, however, as to the im-
portance he attaches to the economic goals of antitrust. And Commissioner Pitofsky, who
argues that, "it is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values
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monopoly, monopolization, and associated monopoly behavior and
the inefficiencies they generate. Given this end, how do we move
from our working definition of predatory pricing to a legal rule or
standard or approach to cope with such behavior?
A major obstacle to a smooth transition from objective to opera-
tional policy is the problematic nature of the "offense" with which
we are concerned. 25 First, predatory pricing suits are brought in re-
sponse to price cuts by a dominant firm. But price cuts are generally
thought to reflect the pressure of competition-a good-rather than
an attempt to monopolize-a bad. Second, a private predatory pricing
action is often motivated by the plaintiff's understandable concern
for its own preservation. Such suits tend to confuse the preservation
of particular competitors and the corresponding private benefits with
the preservation of competition and its attendant social benefits.20
The natural working of competitive market forces often causes the
erosion of particular firms' profits as a result of price competition.
Indeed particular firms may be driven out of business. Because pre-
serving particular competitors may well be in conflict with the goal
of preserving and fostering competition, private predatory pricing
actions carry with them the seeds of protectionist abuse.
The difficulty of formulating a predatory pricing policy that is
in interpreting the antitrust laws," Pitofsky, supra, at 1051, believes that although these
noneconomic factors should be taken into account, "economic concerns would remain
paramount," id. at 1075. Indeed, Pitofsky suggests that vigorous antitrust enforcement
generally furthers both economic and political goals, at least as he defines political goals,
because
[e]limination or containment of monopoly and elimination of unnecessary barriers
to entry and unreasonable business practices not only promote economic efficiency but
tend to avoid undue concentrations of economic power, to reduce the range of private
discretion in the business field, and to minimize the risks of state interference.
Id. at 1066. It is at least arguable that this confluence of economic and political goals
occurs in designing a policy toward predatory pricing. This Article focuses, as the recent
literature on this subject has focused, solely on the economic merits of alternative ap-
proaches to the predator pricing problem.
25. Courts have recognized that predatory pricing is not a well-defined offense. See
Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795-96
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures has noted
that it is important in designing Sherman Act standards aimed at attempts to monopolize
not to draft rules that can be used "to attack aggressive behavior that increases competi-
tion in a market and benefits consumers even at the expense of particular competitors."
ANTITRUST COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 20, at 149 (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); Janich Bros. v. American
Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific
Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977).
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responsive to our basic concern for preserving and fostering the vi-
tality of competition is increased by the fact that the alleged offense
involves a charge of improper behavior by the defendant firm. Policy
can draw on a body of received economic theory and accumulated
empirical studies when addressing itself to structural remedies that
alleviate the characteristics that make monopolistic behavior possible;
it is possible to evaluate, with some confidence, structural character-
istics of a market that may suggest that more firms are necessary to
ensure the health of competition. It is much more difficult to try
to define precisely what pattern of behavior, whether pricing or oth-
erwise, a firm should be allowed to follow and what it should be
enjoined from undertaking when the structure of the relevant mar-
ket is not specified.2 7 However, it is precisely such behavioral re-
strictions that a policy toward predatory pricing seeks: it must dis-
tinguish a "predatory" price cut from a "competitive" one and de-
velop behavioral constraints that deter the former, but not the latter.
II. The Framework for Analysis
Given our working definition of predatory pricing, the central
problem in formulating a policy to cope with such behavior is the
difficult task of inferring unobservable long-run market outcomes
from observable short-run market conditions. Such an enterprise, no
matter how carefully it is done, is inherently uncertain and involves
the possibility of error both because the actual effects of any kind
of observable short-run behavior on long-run outcomes are them-
selves uncertain and because our methods of predicting those effects
are imperfect. This task, however, is unavoidable: to dismiss entirely
an assessment of long-run effects, as for example Areeda and Turner
seem to do,28 is to dismiss the essence of the predatory pricing problem.
Since a profit-maximizing 29 dominant firm will depart from short-
27. The divergence of views one finds in the recent predatory pricing literature con-
cerning the "optimal" rule to apply in evaluating dominant firm behavior, see note 1
supra, is testimony to the difficulty of trying to formulate such behavioral restrictions.
28. See notes 12 &. 17 supra.
29. Our analysis assumes, as have most of the contributions to the recent discussion of
predatory pricing, that firms are profit-maximizers. This assumption is common to the
earlier contributions despite the fact that, as we have noted, see notes 4 & 5 supra, some
commentators have focused primarily on short-run profit maximization while others have
assumed the firm seeks to maximize long-run profits. For a discussion of the implications
for our analysis of relaxing the assumption of profit-maximizing behavior and recognizing
other firm objectives, see note 50 infra.
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run maximizing behavior only if it expects that such a move will
lead to larger long-run profits,30 the best way to assess whether cur-
rent behavior is predatory is to evaluate its expected effects on
long-run market outcomes. Recognizing the perhaps substantial de-
gree of uncertainty involved, we must use information on the ex-
isting market structure and short-run firm behavior to try to infer
what the long-run outcomes will be. The potential errors resulting
from such an inferential process can be classified into two categories.
Adopting the terminology of statistical hypothesis testing, we will
characterize the two kinds of errors as "false positives" (or Type I
errors) and "false negatives" (or Type II errors). These terms, which
we now define, are central to our discussion and the reader is urged
to keep them firmly fixed in mind. A false positive or Type I error
results when the standard being applied to a particular case labels
as predatory behavior that is not, in fact, predatory. On the other
hand, a false negative or Type II error occurs when the standard
does not label as predatory behavior that is, in fact, predatory. Either
error is costly; each causes a loss in economic efficiency. The nature
of the costs associated with each type of error is developed below.
A. Analysis of Error Costs
Two kinds of costs are associated with false positive errors-that
is, with errors that involve labeling truly competitive price cuts as
predatory. First, welfare losses result from the fact that prices may
be kept too high for too long as compared to the levels that would
have resulted if the dominant firm had more leeway to adjust prices.
Second, inefficient firms may be encouraged to remain in the market
or to enter the market. This increases the cost of production of the
product above the efficient level and results in a waste of scarce
resources and hence in a loss of social welfare. It should be noted
that any standard that encourages entry by forcing price to be kept
above long-run marginal cost for a period of time necessarily runs
the risk of preserving inefficient firms, whether existing ones or en-
trants, for some period. The question is whether such a standard
leads a sufficient number of firms to enter or to mature so that
monopoly pricing is eliminated more quickly than it would have
20. In comparing present and future profits, future profits must be discounted to
present value to reflect the fact that they are not available today. A dollar today is,
ceteris paribus, worth more than a dollar a year from now. For a simple exposition of
discounting to present value, see V. BRUDNEY & Nf. CHIREISTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 35-44 (1979).
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been otherwise. If it does, then the short-run social cost of such a
standard may be worth incurring.
The costs associated with false negative errors, with errors that re-
sult because the predation standard is too permissive, are of three
kinds. First, there is a short-run allocative inefficiency 3' if the stan-
dard is so lax that it permits the dominant firm to price below
short-run marginal cost for any period of time. Second, there is the
deadweight loss32 commonly identified with monopolistic pricing.
Under a lax standard, this cost is incurred during those periods after
the dominant firm has succeeded in either driving others from the
market or disciplining the remaining firms to follow its monopolistic-
pricing lead. The third type of social loss caused by a false negative
error consists of the cost inefficiencies that may result from the in-
sulation of the monopoly or dominant firm after it has successfully
restricted competition. If removing the pressure generated by com-
peting firms diminishes the dominant firm's incentive to find ways
to reduce costs-for example, by innovation-the social costs of pro-
ducing that firm's product will be higher than they need be.
Many structural characteristics affect these error costs; no single
structural characteristic is determinative. Instead, one must look at
the interaction of a variety of market characteristics to make reason-
ably sound empirical judgments about the relative magnitudes of the
two sets of error costs. The relevant structural characteristics can be
grouped into three basic categories: (1) factors indicative of short-
run monopoly power; (2) conditions of entry into the market; and
(3) the dynamic effects of competitors or entrants on the costs of
production and the quality of products offered to consumers.
31. Short-run allocative inefficiency occurs in such a situation because short-run mar-
ginal cost represents the short-run opportunity cost-in terms of resources used-of
producing an additional unit of output. If price is less than short-run marginal cost, and
if demand is at all elastic, the price will not give consumers the proper signal about the
scarcity value of the good. Thus, consumers will purchase too much of the good and as
a result, too many resources will be devoted to producing the particular good in the short
run.
32. The deadweight loss of monopolistic pricing can be intuitively understood as
follows. The monopoly price, P, will be higher than the price, C, that would prevail in
a competitive market, and the latter is equal to the short-run marginal cost of producing
the good. Hence, if demand is at all elastic, some consumers will reduce their purchases
if the price is P instead of C. For those consumers, the value of such purchases lies some-
where between C and P. Thus, the increase in price and concomitant decrease in output
brought about by monopolistic pricing causes these consumers to lose the difference be-
tween their valuations and C. The sum of all such losses is the deadweight loss. Note that
no one recoups such losses. In contrast, for all units that would be purchased whether the
price were P or C, consumers must pay P-C more per unit but the firm gains exactly
that amount. For a more complete explanation, see F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 13-19;
for a diagrammatic illustration of the deadweight loss concept, see note 51 infra.
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Discussion of these characteristics serves two purposes. First, we
seek to establish the general relationship between the structural char-
acteristics and the costs of making false positive and false negative
errors. Second, we examine specific issues that arise in assessing the
structural characteristics of any particular market that might be
subject to antitrust review. This discussion facilitates a general un-
derstanding of how structural factors affect the costs of making er-
rors and provides the basis for the first tier of the rule-of-reason ap-
proach to predatory pricing we suggest below.
1. Short-Run Monopoly Power
By definition, a firm with monopoly power can exercise control
over the market price in the short run. If the dominant firm's market
power is substantial, the costs of foregoing temporary price cuts in
exchange for long-term erosion of that power-that is, the costs of false
positive errors-will be smaller than if the firm lacks such market
power.33 The costs of false negative errors are likely to be larger the
greater the dominant firm's opportunity to raise prices and increase
profits once the entry threat has been eliminated. Incorrectly labeling a
dominant firm's temporary price decrease as nonpredatory will re-
sult in substantial long-run welfare losses if such a price drop suc-
ceeds in deterring entry or in inducing exit and thus leaves the
dominant firm with a substantial degree of monopoly power.
Our concern with the market power of the firm as a determinant
of the cost of a false negative error is directed at that market power
after the price cut has successfully reduced competition. The data
to which any predatory pricing rule would have to be applied, how-
ever, would be information about the firm's market power before
its price strategy succeeded in achieving its anticompetitive end. One
would have access to post-price cut data only if one were willing to
let any challenged pricing behavior run its full course of effects;
the latter is clearly inadvisable. Hence, the current monopoly power
33. Of course, the social benefit of a price cut to marginal cost will be larger during
the period price is actually lower, the greater the market power of the firm that institutes
the price reduction. Hence, a temporary price cut to marginal cost will, for the period
it is in effect, yield more social benefit if it is undertaken by a firm with substantial
market power than by one without such dominance. But if the price cut is truly pred-
atory and is being used to drive out existing rivals or to deter new ones from enter-
ing, then the social benefits generated by the price reduction will be transitory and will
be far outweighed by the long-term benefits that would accrue if competition were main-
tained or strengthened. Our point is that the ratio of the long-run benefits of competition
to the short-run costs of foregoing temporary competition-reducing price cuts will be
greater the more market power the price-cutting firm possesses.
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of the alleged predator is used as a guide to what its power would
be if its price-cutting behavior led competition to be reduced. The
current market power provides a lower bound to the power that
would follow upon the execution of a successful predatory price cut.
Measuring monopoly power is, to be sure, not an easy task.34 How-
ever, an examination of the dominant firm's market share, the num-
ber and size distribution of firms already in the market, the stability
of market shares over time, and historical evidence on the profits
earned by the dominant firm should be useful in assessing the short-
run monopoly power of the dominant firm and in providing insights
into whether that monopoly power has been exploited over time.
Thus, the traditional indices of monopoly power that are routinely
used by the courts in monopoly and monopolization cases35 consti-
tute the place to begin. Nevertheless, since we propose below that
a more detailed and systematic investigation of structural character-
istics be undertaken, the traditional emphasis on finding "the rele-
vant market"36 is probably uncalled for; a fairly rough determina-
tion of the products that are close substitutes for one another is all
that is needed at this stage.
This basic information should be supplemented by an assessment
of the elasticity of demand37 for the dominant firm's product. Quite
34. See Dansby & Willig, Industry Performance Gradient Indexes, 69 Am. ECON. REV.
249 (1979) (discussing structural factors that affect welfare losses resulting from exploita-
tion of market power and discussing which particular indicators of structure are appro-
priate in different behavioral scenarios).
35. The indicator of a defendant firm's monopoly power that is most widely used by
courts is the firm's share of the relevant market. Where a firm controls a predominant
share of the relevant market, this alone may suffice for a finding of monopoly power.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
343 n.1 (D. Mass. 1953), affd Per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Conversely, a relatively
small share of the relevant market may be conclusive of a lack of monopoly power. See,
e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399, 404 (1956); Holleb
& Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). At times, when market
share data have been inconclusive, other characteristics of the relevant market have been
considered. In different instances, the defendant's profit margin, the number of firms in
the industry, the relative size and strength of the remaining competitors, the historical
trend in the defendant's market share, the ease with which new competitors may enter
the market, and the elasticity of demand in the maiket have been taken into account.
See generally 2 AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, supra note 1, at 507-13; 16 J.O. VON KALINOW-
SKY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[3] (1979).
36. See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961);
1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 691 (1973). But see Schmalensee, supra
note 3, at 1004-16 (there may exist no one precise relevant market in many antitrust
cases).
37. The price elasticity of demand for a firm's product is defined as the percentage
change in the quantity demanded brought about by a one percent change in the price,
ceteris paribus. See W. NIcHOLsON, MICROECONoarsc THEORY 680 (2d ed. 1978).
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simply, the opportunity to extract monopoly profits is inversely re-
lated to the elasticity of demand. Hence the less elastic the demand
for the product, the greater is the cost of not identifying a practice
that is predatory as such-that is, the higher is the cost of a false
negative error. On the other hand, the deadweight loss that results
from giving the monopolist less leeway to adjust prices downward
in response to entry is smaller when demand is inelastic than when
it is elastic. The less elastic is demand, then, the lower the cost of a
false positive error.
2. Conditions of Entry
A dominant firm's short-run monopoly power is not of particular
concern in and of itself. The critical question is whether or not the
dominant firm can use that monopoly power to maintain prices above
the competitive level for some significant period of time, and this
depends on the conditions of entry into the market. We have chosen
to categorize this part of the structural investigation in terms of "con-
ditions of entry" rather than "barriers to entry,"'13  because the tra-
ditional examples of "entry barriers" are both too restrictive and
too easily misinterpreted. In particular, they do not capture the dy-
namics of entry processes in different markets that are essential for
determining whether potential competition constitutes an effective
constraint on the pricing behavior of a dominant firm.
Even if there is only one firm in the market, and the elasticity of
demand for its product is fairly low, a firm is not in a position to
exercise its monopoly power if new firms with additional production
capacity can quickly and easily enter a market should prices be raised
to a point above the competitive level. In this case, potential com-
petition effectively constrains the ability of a dominant firm to en-
gage in monopoly pricing for any significant period of time. On the
other hand, if entry is costly and time-consuming, the dominant firm
will be in a position to exercise its latent monopoly power. Other things
being equal, the more costly entry is and the longer it takes for new
firms to enter a market in response to monopoly prices, the higher are
the costs of false negative errors and the lower the costs of false positive
errors.
The combination of a highly concentrated market, low demand
elasticity, and entry conditions that indicate that potential competi-
tion does not respond or responds only slowly to prices set at supra-
38. For a discussion of entry conditions and barriers to entry, see 2 AREEDA-TURNER
TREATISE, supra note 1, at 409; F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 216-34; Williamson Response,
supra note 1, at 1195-96.
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competitive levels should be an area of primary concern for antitrust
enforcement; failing to label a predatory price cut as predatory in
such situations would be very costly. Similarly, if the conditions of
entry are such that competitors enter the market quickly as prices
rise above the competitive level, the costs of not labeling a price cut
as predatory when it is will not be very large since potential com-
petition severely limits the ability of a dominant firm to exercise
monopoly power.
There are certain structural characteristics of a market that affect
entry conditions and thus the ability of potential competition to pro-
vide an effective constraint on the pricing behavior of a dominant
firm. First, we should look at the amount of capital required by a
new firm to enter a market at minimum efficient scale. If capital
requirements are very large, it is less likely that entrants will respond
quickly, if at all, as prices rise above competitive levels. Capital re-
quirements may represent a constraint on entry, even when prices
are above competitive levels; because capital markets may not be
perfect,39 evidence of substantial sustained supranormal profits may
be needed before the required capital commitments can be made.
Even if capital markets are perfect, large capital requirements may
be indicative of the need to build large-scale production facilities
or to develop extensive distribution networks that may take a con-
siderable amount of time to complete. This means that entrants can
respond to monopoly prices only after a substantial lag time; a firm
with monopoly power easily may be able to exploit this entry lag
by raising prices in the interim.
Second, we should seek to determine whether the existing dominant
firm has been successful in establishing a significant "brand prefer-
ence" 40 in the eyes of consumers, not by producing an objectively
better product, but by having been first in the market or by having
made extensive "image" advertising expenditures. Faced with such a
market, an entrant not only may have to invest the resources that
are technically required to establish production and distribution net-
works but also may have to undertake substantial promotional ex-
39. See Posner Article, supra note 1, at 945; Williamson, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J.
647, 656-59 (1974) (reviewing W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL).
40. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572 (1967); FTC v. Borden Co.,
383 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1966); J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 116 (1956); Schmalensee,
supra note 3, at 1002, 1033. "First mover" dominant firms may have a "generic name"
advantage, see id., or may have engaged in substantial advertising expenditures to dif-
ferentiate their products from others that are functionally equivalent, see FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572 (1967); F. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 341.
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penditures, both to get its product known and to overcome brand
loyalties that the dominant firm has achieved. In such situations,
successful entry will be more costly and more time-consuming, and,
as a result, potential competition will be a less effective constraint
on the existing dominant firm. 41 As a result, courts should recognize
that because generic names and premium brand images induced by
advertising change the conditions of entry in such a way that poten-
tial competition is a less effective constraint on prices than it other-
wise might be, dominant firm behavior in such markets may be worthy
of closer scrutiny.
A third characteristic of the conditions of entry in a particular
market is the ease with which productive resources or assets can be
transferred from one firm to another. For any number of reasons, it
may be difficult to transfer to new owners the assets of a firm that
exits. If there are substantial benefits to "learning by doing" 42 in
production or if production in a technologically sophisticated in-
dustry requires the coordination of a number of individuals in im-
portant design teams and such teams are broken up when the firm
exits,43 transferability will be limited. The dominant firm could, in
fact, facilitate this disintegration of the team by hiring away key
personnel when the firm exits.
If assets are not easily transferable, an exit from the market carries
with it a reduction in productive capacity and hence the likelihood
of social inefficiency. As a result, the cost of a false negative error
is higher when there are frictions in the asset-transfer process. The
reverse is also true; that is, ceteris paribus, the easier it is for the
assets of an exiting firm to be taken over and used by an entrant,
the more likely it is that effective competitive pressures can be main-
41. See Schmalensee, subra note 3, at 1032-43 (analysis in context of processed lemon
juice industry); Schmalensee, Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal in-
dustry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978) (analysis in context of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal
industry). We recognize that the "brand preference" question raises serious problems. For
example, how are we to decide whether the benefits of a "generic name" are really
attributable to the "accidental" fact that a particular firm was first in the market rather
than to the skill and foresight of a first mover? How are we to determine whether ad-
vertising expenditures that establish a brand image and a brand preference represent
expenditures that "fool" consumers or actually "inform" them of the true differential
worth of a particular product? The answer is that such determinations are difficult. But
we do know that in such situations entry is more costly and occurs more slowly and thus
a dominant firm has more control over price for a longer period of time.
42. See Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REv. ECON. STUD.
155 (1962); Hirsch, Manufacturing Progress Functions, 34 Rlv. ECON. & STAT. 143 (1952).
43. See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS
15-16 (1971); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IM-
PLICATIONs 60-64 (1975).
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tained and the more costly it is for society to force the dominant firm
to maintain an excessively high price.
Related to the transferability of assets is the nature of the entry
process in the particular market. Consider a dominant firm that
serves several different submarkets. 44 The market may be divided by
geographical area, product line, or type of consumer. Differential
start-up costs may then lead new firms to enter the market sequen-
tially-that is, to start in one submarket and then expand into others.45
By running losses in the "entry point" submarkets, the dominant firm
could protect its dominant position in the other submarkets. In ef-
fect, the entrenched firm could use its pricing strategy in the entry
point submarkets to make entry more difficult in the other submar-
kets it serves. This type of strategy could succeed in deterring po-
tential entrants, particularly when the entry sequence is founded on
technological considerations. When differential costs of entry lead
new firms to sequence submarkets in a particular order, the dom-
inant firm's strategy may, over time, lead to a reordering of the entry
sequence. But, in the interim, potential entrants will have been sig-
nificantly discouraged, if not totally deterred. When a market is char-
acterized by a natural progression of submarkets to be entered, the
costs of false negative errors will be higher than if no such sequence
existed. Correspondingly, the costs of false positive errors will be
lower when such an entry sequence exists than when one does not.
The last structural factor in this category is the nature of informa-
tion flows in the market and, in particular, the availability of infor-
mation concerning the perceptions of risks of entry. The exit of a
number of firms from a market, whether simultaneously or in rapid
succession, increases the perceived long-term risks of entry into the
44. "Submarket" here is not meant to refer to the antitrust concept of a distinct
market as a "line of commerce," the concentration of which is viewed as relevant for
purposes of examining mergers or attempted monopolization. See, e.g., United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 273-77 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 324-28, 335-39 (1962).
45. The computer industry seems to us to be an example of a market in which a
wide range of entry strategies might be considered by potential entrants. A firm could
try to enter the market by initially producing a broad array of computer system hard-
ware and software-central processing units of various sizes and a full array of peripheral
equipment necessary to complete the system. This would presumably be a high-cost
entry strategy. Alternatively, potential entrants might consider entering the market by
producing a much narrower array of products-small central processing units only or
particular types of peripheral equipment that could be used with central processing
units already in production. In the latter case, an entrant's strategy would be to establish
itself in one segment of the market, at lower initial cost than entry across the entire
spectrum of products would entail, and then to expand into additional segments of the
market with the expectation that such expansion might be accomplished more easily than
full-scale entry initially.
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market. This is especially true if those who depart were, in fact,
recent entrants. If potential entrants or the suppliers of capital to
such entrants perceive that the risks in the particular market are
greater than they had previously thought them to be, the cost of
capital to new entrants will rise.46
If the new perception is grounded in underlying real characteris-
tics of the market-for example, demand is more uncertain than it
had been thought to be or input supplies are less reliable than they
were thought to be-then the cost of capital should increase to im-
prove the resource allocation signals in the economy. However, if
the riskier impression of the market is due, instead, to predatory pric-
ing on the part of a dominant firm, then the resulting increase in
the cost of capital is not justified in terms of resource allocation
goals; it generates the wrong signals concerning the social value of
an input, capital, in alternative uses. Although the rise in the cost
of capital to entrants might be accurately reflecting the riskiness of
the market given that a dominant firm is allowed to follow a preda-
tory pricing strategy, the cost that it is socially efficient to have re-
flected is the value of capital in the market when such behavior is
not permitted.
Hence, predatory pricing behavior can enable a dominant firm to
make the long-run risks of entry look substantially higher than they
actually are. The dominant firm's ability to generate such false sig-
nals will be greater when information flows concerning the market
are poor. The more impacted information is, 47 the higher is the cost
of a false negative error and the lower is the cost of a false positive
error.
Thus, structural characteristics determine whether potential com-
petition would be sufficient to constrain the pricing behavior of a
dominant firm. When entry into a given market is difficult, a dom-
inant firm may enjoy sufficient long-run monopoly power to increase
prices for a significant period of time.
3. Dynamic Effects of Competitors and Entrants
One of the most important factors leading to increases in national
income over the last century has been technological change, including
the introduction of new processes that reduce the costs of producing
46. See V. BRUDNEY 9 M. cHIRELsTEIN, suPra note 30, at 61-68.
47. Information impactedness exists When the "true underlying circumstances relevant
to [a] transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one or more parties but
cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others.' 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note
43, at 31.
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existing products as well as the development of new and better prod-
ucts that better satisfy the desires of consumers.48 Although it is gen-
erally thought that the structure of industrial markets affects the
rate of technological change, the theoretical and empirical literature
supports widely divergent views about which structure is preferable.
For some commentators, monopoly power is an important spur to in-
novation, while for others competition with patent protection is the
most effective inducement for rapid technological change. We do not
intend to resolve this debate here; indeed, the debate may well be
unresolvable as a general matter. Technological change is still so
poorly understood and the history of innovative activity differs so
much from one market to another that we doubt that a general theory
linking market structure variables to the rate and direction of tech-
nological change will be convincingly sustained empirically in the
near future. However, this does not mean that the effects of compe-
tition on innovation can be ignored in assessing the costs of false
positive and false negative errors. On the contrary, since innovation
has such important effects on social welfare and since a general theory
is lacking, the innovative characteristics of the specific firms and
markets under investigation should be examined.
In order to assess the relevant error costs, an inquiry should be
made into the sources of process and product innovations in the mar-
ket being scrutinized. Has the dominant firm been a primary source
of technological innovations or have smaller firms and entrants been
the innovators? In markets in which competition appears not to foster
innovation but in which, perhaps because of economies of scale, a
relatively insulated dominant firm is a more likely source of tech-
nological progress, the cost of false positives is higher and the cost
of false negatives is lower. Under these circumstances, forcing a dom-
inant firm to keep its price high enough for long enough so that
competing firms enter and thrive may engender substantial sacrifices
of cost-saving innovation. And, although a social loss will be incurred
if we allow a monopolist who temporarily decreases his price to suc-
ceed in excluding other firms, the cost of such a false negative error
48. We recognize, as will anyone familiar with the literature on technological change
and market structure, that ascertaining the relationship between the degree of competi-
tion and the pace of innovation will be very difficult. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, sutra note 5,
at 346-78; Markham, Concentration: A Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation? in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 247 (H. Goldschmid, et al., eds. 1974). Nevertheless,
even if such considerations can enter only in extreme cases-where there is reason to
believe that competition has a very beneficial or a very deleterious effect on technological
progress in production for the market being examined-they are very important in any
genuinely long-run view of the social-welfare effects of short-run pricing behavior.
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will be mitigated by the enhanced technological progress that results
from the monopolist's successful self-preservation. In contrast, failing
to identify predatory price actions is more costly and mislabeling a
truly competitive pricing strategy as predatory is less costly when the
rate of technological change is positively affected by an increase in the
number of firms in the market, that is, when small competitors or
entrants have been the major sources of innovation.
Beyond the consideration of the sources of technological change,
a general picture of the dynamics of the market under investigation
is important for the evaluation of error costs. Is the market growing
rapidly? Is the industry a "declining industry"? Do prices tend to
rise and fall with cyclical changes in supply and demand? If an in-
dustry is growing very rapidly and the products being sold are new
products introduced by the dominant firm, we might expect to find
both that there is substantial entry and that the dominant firm is
earning profits that appear to be above the long-run competitive level.
Rather than indicating a long-run monopoly problem, however, the
size and profitability of the dominant firm may be reflecting only the
short-run disequilibrium characteristics of a very competitive indus-
try. In such a market, the costs of false positives would be relatively
high and the costs of false negatives relatively low. Similarly, in a
declining industry we are unlikely to observe entry; rather we are
likely to observe some firms exiting while the remaining firms achieve
larger shares of a declining market. In this case, we would not neces-
sarily want to interpret increasing concentration as reflecting in-
creases in monopoly power.
Although other structural factors may affect the costs of the two
kinds of errors associated with any predatory pricing standard,49 our
discussion has focused on what we think are the principal elements; 50
49. For example, the structure of the consumer side of the market might also merit
examination in particular cases. Is the product purchased by a relatively small number
of large, sophisticated industrial firms or is the product purchased primarily by a large
number of individual consumers? In the first instance, concentration on the buyers' side
might constrain the monopoly power the dominant firm can exercise, while in the second
instance the demand side will not impose much restraint on the firm's exercise of
monopoly power.
50. Our discussion of how structural factors affect the costs of false positive and false
negative errors has assumed that the dominant firm is a "cost minimizer," that is, given
existing technology and input prices, the firm produces its chosen level of output at
minimum cost. In the microeconomic theory of firm behavior, cost minimization follows
from one of two assumptions: (i) the objective of the firm's management is to maximize
short-run profits or, alternatively, (ii) there are numerous competitors or there is easy
entry so that those firms that survive in the long run will be cost minimizers whether or
not specific individual firms observed at any particular time are cost minimizers. See
Nelson & Winter, Factor Price changes and factor substitution in an evolutionary model, 6
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examination of these elements provides a way of identifying the kinds
of markets in which the costs of false positive errors and false nega-
tive errors are likely to be high or low.
B. Analysis of the Probabilities of Error
Let us now turn to the probability of making each type of error.
Consider first the probability that a false positive error is made: a
particular price reduction is declared predatory when it is not. The
probability of such an error depends on three factors: the probability
that an observed price cut is, in fact, not predatory; the standard
used to classify that reduction as predatory or not predatory; and the
accuracy with which the standard is applied. Similarly, the probabili-
BELL. J. ECON. 466 (1975); Nelson SL Winter, Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of
Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus, 84 EcoN. J. 886 (1974); Winter, Satisficing,
Selection, and the Innovating Remnant, 85 Q.J. EcoN. 237 (1971).
In reality, neither of these assumptions necessarily holds in those markets that are likely
to be of most concern to antitrust monopoly policy. Managerial objectives may include
other variables besides profits, such as sales or the growth rate of the firm, or more
personal managerial objectives such as salary, security, power, or prestige. See W. B.UssOL,
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52, 86-104 (rev. ed. 1967); Williamson, Man-
agerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 1032, 1033-38 (1963). Or,
there may be so few competitors, or entry may be so difficult, that competition does not
perform its "natural selection" role. As a result, a dominant firm may depart from cost
minimization and waste resources; this phenomenon has been referred to as "X-in-
efficiency," see Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency,' 56 ANI. ECON. REV.
392 (1966), or "organizational slack," see R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
THE FIRm 36-38 (1963). Furthermore, if an existing firm with short-run monopoly power
has as its goal the maximization of long-run profits, it may find it advantageous to allocate
resources to deterring entry. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 184-85. Thus, for example, a
dominant firm may have an incentive to carry excess capacity to deter entry. See Spence,
Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing, 8 BELL. J. ECON. 534 (1977). What-
ever the reason, departures from cost minimization, which seem most likely to occur in
markets with monopoly characteristics, represent real social costs of monopoly, costs
which antitrust policy should seek to eliminate.
Given these considerations, it is reasonable to ask why we have not listed "departures
from cost minimization" as one of the structural characteristics affecting error costs. Note
first that we have in fact focused on dynamic departures from cost minimization by
suggesting that the effects of competition on technological change are important. On the
other hand, we have not focused directly on static departures from cost minimization.
A number of reasons support our decision. First, "organizational slack" and "X-inef-
ficiency" are extremely difficult to measure in any systematic or reliable fashion. Second,
the sources of inefficiency resulting from long-run profit maximization constitute particu-
lar aspects of behavior that are best addressed as part of an inquiry into behavior rather
than as part of the structural analysis. Third and perhaps most important, situations in
which departures from cost minimization are most likely to occur are readily identified
with structural factors that we have discussed in detail-short-run monopoly power, condi-
tions of entry, and the dynamic effects of competition. As a general matter, where
structural factors are such that the traditional welfare costs of false negatives are high
(substantial short-run monopoly power, difficult entry conditions, etc.), considerations of
static departures from cost minimization make them even higher. Rather than trying to
estimate departures from cost minimization directly, we identify the structural factors that
are likely to make such costs large.
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ty of committing a false negative error is determined by the proba-
bility that an observed price cut is, in fact, predatory, the standard
used to identify predation, and the way the standard is applied. Hence,
each of the error probabilities depends on the propensity of a dom-
inant firm, operating subject to a particular legal standard, to en-
gage in predatory pricing, on the nature of that standard, and on its
application by enforcement agencies, judges, and juries.
The dominant firm's proclivity to engage in predatory pricing,
given that the legality of any price reduction it makes will be evaluated
against a particular standard, is rather complicated to assess. One way
to examine the firm's pricing decision under these circumstances is
to think about it as resulting from the interaction of two component
parts: the incentive a profit-maximizing dominant firm would have to
make predatory price reductions if its pricing policy were subject to no
legal constraints, and the nature of the constraints imposed by the
particular legal standard being considered.
The more profitable it is for an "unconstrained" dominant firm-
one whose pricing decisions are unfettered by legal constraints-to
choose a truly predatory pricing strategy, the more likely it is that
such a firm will make that choice. Hence, the first of the two com-
ponents of the actual firm's decision essentially asks the following:
How profitable would it be for a dominant firm whose pricing de-
cision is unconstrained by the law to choose a strategy that is truly
predatory? The answer depends on the same structural characteristics
that affect the cost of the two types of errors. When, ceteris paribus,
one of the structural factors we have discussed is associated with a
higher cost of failing to detect a truly predatory pricing cut, such a
reduction is also more profitable for the unconstrained dominant
firm. To see why, observe that such a firm's proclivity to engage in
predatory pricing will be greater the higher the level of profit it can
expect to earn in the future if it succeeds in deterring new entry
or driving out existing rivals. And the firm's tendency to pursue such
a pricing strategy will also be greater the smaller the sacrifice in
short-run profits it must incur by decreasing its price and keeping
it low until the desired restriction of competition has been achieved.
But a structural factor that, ceteris paribus, increases the social costs
in the period after the dominant firm has successfully insulated itself
from competition also increases the private gain accruing to the
firm in that future period. Similarly, a structural characteristic that,
all other things equal, decreases the social benefits of a price cut in
the earlier period when competition is being eliminated also decreases
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the private costs to the dominant firm of such a price reduction.
Hence, the structural characteristics that increase the social cost of a
false negative error are also associated with greater net private profit-
ability of truly predatory pricing.51
Given an observed price reduction by an unconstrained dominant
firm, the probability that the price cut is predatory is therefore higher
when the structural factors that raise the social cost of false negative
errors are present than when they are not. By a similar line of argu-
ment, if a particular structural feature results in a higher cost of a
false positive error, it is also associated with a lower probability that
a price cut by such an unconstrained firm is actually predatory.52
When there are no legal constraints on pricing policy, a dominant
firm in a market with "monopoly" structural characteristics, which
result in higher costs of false negative errors, will find a predatory
price reduction more attractive than will a dominant firm in a mar-
ket with "competitive" structural characteristics, which lead to higher
costs of false positive errors.
51. In terms of the standard representation of a monopolist's static profit-maximizing
equilibrium, the size of the "deadweight loss triangle" increases as the size of the monop-
olist's "profit rectangle" increases, and the former decreases as the latter decreases. In
the special case of a linear demand curve and constant marginal cost of production, the
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MR 0 Output
The profit rectangle ABCG is twice as large as the deadweight loss triangle CGE where
MC is the marginal cost curve, MR is the marginal revenue curve, and D is the demand
curve.
52. While a particular characteristic of the "unconstrained" dominant firm or the
market it serves moves the probability of predation and the cost of a false negative in
the same direction, and also alters the probability of truly predatory price cuts and
the cost of false positive errors in opposite directions, this says nothing about the
magnitude of those effects. Moreover, the probability of predatory behavior by such a
firm and the cost of each type of error will, to the extent they depend on structural
characteristics, depend on the full set of firm-specific and market-specific structural
features.
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We will not present a detailed catalogue of each of the structural
characteristics we have discussed. However, consider the following
example of how structural factors affect the probability that an un-
constrained dominant firm will make a predatory price reduction.
The greater the short-run monopoly power of the dominant firm,
ceteris paribus, the higher is the probability of predatory pricing when
the firm is free to choose any pricing strategy. This does not say any-
thing about the absolute size of the probability; it does not, for ex-
ample, say that if we observe a temporary reduction of price by an
unconstrained dominant firm with substantial short-run monopoly
power, then it is highly likely that the reduction is part of a preda-
tory pricing strategy. All it says is that if we observe such a price
reduction, then it is more likely that the reduction is predatory if
the dominant firm currently has considerable short-run monopoly
power than if it does not. The more short-run monopoly power
the firm possesses, the greater will be its ability to raise prices, and
thereby increase profits, if it succeeds in eliminating the threat of
entry. Hence, extinguishing such threats is more valuable to a firm
with more short-run monopoly power than to one with less control,
and, in the absence of legal restrictions, such entry-deterring strategies
are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be pursued by firms with more
market power.
The preceding discussion has suggested how structural characteris-
tics affect the profitability, and hence the likelihood, of predatory
pricing when the dominant firm knows that its pricing policy will not
be subject to legal challenge. However, the introduction of a stan-
dard to be used in judging the legality of the firm's pricing behavior
will alter this assessment of profitability. The probability that viola-
tions of the standard will be detected and the penalties imposed for
such violations determine whether the firm perceives itself as abso-
lutely constrained from pursuing certain pricing policies or perceives
only a decrease in the probability that it will actually enjoy the
long-term benefits of predatory price cuts. Thus, the likelihood that
a firm whose pricing policy is being assessed in terms of a particular
legal standard will make predatory price cuts will depend on two
factors: the behavior that would be most profitable for the uncon-
strained firm given the structural characteristics affecting the un-
constrained firm's profit calculus, and the nature and application of
the legal standard.
Thus, the character of the legal standard influences the error prob-
abilities indirectly by affecting the firm's incentives to make preda-
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tory price cuts. The nature of the legal standard, however, also has
a direct effect on the probabilities of false positive and false nega-
tive errors. The factors that the standard takes into account affect
the probability that the standard will lead to particular kinds of
errors; a standard that ignores the relevant considerations discussed
above will be more error-prone than one that takes them into ac-
count. For example, a rule that is based only on static market con-
ditions and ignores dynamic considerations is much more likely to
generate errors than is one that gives appropriate weight to dynamic
factors.
Furthermore, the strictness of the standard in evaluating the fac-
tors it does consider also affects the error probabilities. The more
stringent the standard is, the greater the probability of a false posi-
tive and the smaller the probability of a false negative. For example,
a per se rule that declares illegal any price reduction by a firm
whose share of a particular product market exceeds sixty percent,
will have quite a high probability of declaring a firm's price preda-
tory when it is not, while it will also have a relatively low probability
of making a false negative error. On the other hand, suppose the rule
in effect declares nonpredatory any price at which gross revenues ex-
ceed variable costs and requires a demonstration that the firm has set
price below average variable cost before the firm's action is declared
illegal.53 In this case, there will be a low probability of making a
false positive error, but the probability of a false negative error
will be high.
Finally, the ability of judges and juries to understand and apply
any particular standard will affect the probabilities that the particu-
lar policy will result in each kind of error. This institutional com-
petence issue-the putative inability of judges and juries to make
certain kinds of complex determinations and to apply those analyses
consistently across cases-is sometimes invoked as a conclusive ground
for relying on a per se rule rather than on a rule-of-reason approach.
The question of how well these decisionmakers can apply the tools
of economic theory to monopoly and monopolization cases has often
troubled commentators who view economic efficiency as the goal of
antitrust policy.5 4 Even those people who argue that the antitrust
laws were not intended for the single-minded pursuit of economic
53. See Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at 716-18; pp. 250-52 infra (discussing
use of average variable cost).
54. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 80-81, 411-18; Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1, 20 (1977).
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efficiency 55 agree that if judges and juries are going to use the cri-
terion of economic efficiency as a guideline, it is preferable that
they do so in a correct and consistent way.
Given judges' and jurors' training and the available empirical in-
formation, the ability of these decisionmakers to apply economic prin-
ciples correctly and consistently is likely to be imperfect. The critical
question is how far short they will fall in applying each of the al-
ternative rules. But the answer to this question is only one factor
to be considered in assessing error probabilities and choosing an ap-
proach to predatory pricing. For although a per se rule may be easier
to apply than a more complicated rule, the benefits of its simplicity
may well be outweighed by the cost of its inaccuracy if the rule fails
to encompass important elements of the market situation. Moreover,
the simplicity of such a rule may be more apparent than real.
Consider, for example, the simple rule mentioned earlier that would
declare illegal per se any price reduction by a firm whose market
share exceeds sixty percent. This rule would have a low probability
of making a false negative error by declaring a firm's pricing behavior
nonpredatory when it was predatory, but it would have a high prob-
ability of making the opposite kind of error-declaring predatory a
truly nonpredatory price cut. The resulting costs of the inaccurate
decisions reached could well outweigh the simplicity of the rule.
Application of such a mechanical rule can lead to errors that would
have been avoided had a broader examination of available economic
information been undertaken. Furthermore, the "sixty percent mar-
ket share" rule is simple only until one begins to inquire into the
appropriate way to measure market share. What, for instance, are
the bounds of the relevant market? How will degrees of substitutability
be gauged? There is no "right" way to define the relevant market
if the intention is to use this simple measurement to distinguish
predatory pricing from competitive pricing.56 Hence, the statement
of the rule is deceptively simple; articulating a simple-sounding rule
does not ensure that it will be correctly applied. Although not all
simple per se rules are subject to the same problems as is the "sixty
percent market share" rule, simple per se rules can be misused just
as more complicated approaches can.57
55. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 24, at 1051-58, 1060-65; Scherer, supra note 24, at
975-81.
56. See Schmalensee, supra note 3, at 1015-16.
57. For an example of the difficulties engendered in applying an apparently simple
rule, see our discussion of In re Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, United
States International Trade Commission Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (Feb. 22, 1978), at
pp. 263-64 infra.
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C. Implementation Costs
There are several kinds of implementation costs associated with any
particular standard. First, and most obvious, are the costs of the
judicial and legal resources needed to apply and enforce the stan-
dard. A truly simple rule that required for its application only a
small number of easily determined facts and that provided clear
directions for the evaluation of those facts would be the least costly
in terms of these resources. As more complicated approaches are
considered, more information is required and more complex deter-
minations must be made, with the result that the total cost of the
time of lawyers, judges, and jurors increases. Resource demands would
be greatest if the approach chosen necessitated an "all-factors" analysis
in every predatory pricing case; such an approach would require that,
in any case of alleged predation, the judge or jury undertake a rela-
tively unstructured, open-textured inquiry into the complex structur-
al and behavioral characteristics of both the defendant dominant firm
and the market in which it operates.58
The second kind of implementation cost is rather different. Given
any predatory pricing rule or standard, dominant firms will adapt
their behavior so as to reduce, if not eliminate, their vulnerability
to legal sanction. These strategic adaptations, as Williamson has
termed them, are "intertemporal efforts by established firms to take
up advance positions and respond contingently to rivalry in ways that
either discipline existing rivals, or discourage potential competition,
or both."59 Such patterns of prepositioning and contingent response
may engender significant costs of their own. For example, Scherer
and Williamson have argued that if the Areeda-Turner cost-based
rules were adopted as the rule of law, the response by dominant firms
would have adverse welfare consequences for the preentry phase.0°
58. Professor Scherer has advocated such an approach and believes it can be made
operational, but other commentators view the resource costs of using an all-factors
analysis in every case as being so high that they characterize the approach as unworkable.
See note 9 supra.
Professor Williamson equates Scherer's proposal with establishing a price commission
to supplant antitrust enforcement and is skeptical about the ultimate success of such a
venture. See Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at 288 n.16. Of course, if an approach
were to require the establishment and operation of a new administrative regulatory
agency to hear and to decide cases of alleged predatory pricing, or if the approach were
to entail allocating that function to an existing body, the costs of any new administrative
agency activity would have to be taken into account. Although no one contributing to
the discussion has explicitly suggested such an approach, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility.
59. Williamson Response, supra note 1, at 1185.
60. See Scherer Proposal, supra note 1, at 883 (Areeda-Turner rules will encourage
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A dominant firm would be led to operate with excess capacity, to
produce an output below the socially optimal level, and to sell that
output at a price above the socially optimal level. Dominant firms
would thereby gain the advantage of being able to respond as strong-
ly as the Areeda-Turner rules allow when a new competitor appears
or an existing firm expands. If entry did occur nevertheless, the wel-
fare consequences in the post-entry period would also be adverse; as
Williamson shows, the total industry output after the entrant ap-
peared, or the old competitor expanded, would be produced at a
higher cost than it need be.61
Alternative predatory pricing standards would have different im-
plementation costs associated with dominant firms' adaptation to the
legal rules. For example, Williamson's output-restraining rule would
prohibit a dominant firm from expanding its output for a specified
period of time-twelve to eighteen months-in response to new en-
try. 2 A dominant firm faced with the Williamson output-limitation
rule would recognize that one of its entry-deterring (expansion-retard-
ing) strategies-namely, creation of excess capacity, which could serve
as a credible threat of output expansion if entry were to occur-had
been removed. In response, one would expect such a firm to turn to
alternative devices or policies, such as image advertising or other sell-
ing activity, to make entry more difficult. A full evaluation of the
effects of the Williamson rule, taking into account strategic behavior
concerns, would require a determination of the welfare consequences,
in both the preentry and post-entry phases, of the firm's substitution
of one means of deterring entry for another.0 3
Only if we had a "perfect" rule for coping with predatory pricing
would there be no additional resource costs attributable to strategic
adaptation by dominant firms. Of course, no such "perfect" rule exists;
the idealization serves simply as a benchmark against which to measure
the costs of feasible rules.
dominant firms to hold costly excess capacity); Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at
299-302, 307-12 (Areeda-Turner rules will result in lower preentry welfare than William-
son output-restriction rule).
61. See Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at 309-10.
62. Id. at 296.
63. Professor Williamson discusses two entry deterrence strategies that do not involve
price reduction or output expansion: holding back technological developments for later
strategic use and increasing selling expense (e.g., advertising) to fight entrants. See id.
at 306 n.61. Williamson concludes that holding back technology is likely to be counter-
productive for firms and, in any event, would be difficult for courts to control. Id. With
respect to selling expense, he notes that it is only likely to be effective as a predatory
practice where "image" advertising is involved, i.e., heavy promotion of consumer goods
"to emphasize real or imagined differences." Id.
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Two other kinds of implementation costs are generated by any
policy that does not provide a "bright line" between what is legal
behavior and what is not. First, in the absence of a bright-line stan-
dard, the costs of harassing litigation will increase as suits are
brought by competitors seeking to protect themselves. An ambiguous
rule makes it easier for such potential litigants to cloak their pro-
tectionist enterprise in a predatory pricing suit. Such complaints are
costly to the defendant firm, and, to the extent the cause is without
merit, they are costly to society as a whole.
Second, in the absence of a bright-line rule, firms' decisionmaking
processes are subject to greater uncertainty; a firm cannot be sure
whether its pricing policies are legal. The uncertainty generated by
the confusing signals that dominant firms would receive from the
case law could cause the predatory pricing standard to have no de-
terrent effect or to have a perverse efficiency effect.
These costs are highest for an "all-factors" unstructured, case-by-case
approach, lower for the Areeda-Turner cost-based rule or the William-
son output-restriction rule, and even lower for a per se market share
rule.64 Per se rules reduce litigiousness and spurious private damage
actions and reduce firms' uncertainty about what pricing behavior is
legal. But, once again, although this is an attractive property of per se
rules, it is only one factor to consider.
III. A Proposed Two-Tier Approach
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the probabili-
ty that predatory pricing will occur and the costs that such pricing
will engender if it does occur vary according to the inherently dif-
ferent characteristics of different markets. As a result, given any par-
ticular predatory pricing rule, there will be differences across mar-
kets in both the probabilities and costs of false positive and false
negative errors. The costs of implementing any given policy will also
vary across markets. 65 In sum, the "optimal" rule for one market
situation will not be "optimal" for all market situations.
We can, of course, conceptualize the process of selecting a per se
64. Current concern about the costs of litigation is reflected in the substantial atten-
tion the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures gave to
arguments that rules not focused on conduct (e.g., per se rules based on market structure)
will reduce litigation costs. See ANTITRUST COMMIISSION REPORT, sutra note 20, at 151-54.
65. The ease or difficulty of assessing important facts-for example, market share or
price-cost margin-will vary across markets as, for example, the degree of product dif-
ferentiation varies. Also, the ability of a dominant firm to adapt to one legal rule or
another will depend on the market in which it operates.
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behavioral rule that would apply to all market situations. But to
choose such a rule correctly we must be prepared to make subjective
probability judgments about the distribution of market structures
and hence the distribution of alternative error cost/error probability/
implementation cost combinations. Using this subjective probability
distribution together with a complete calculation of the expected to-
tal cost of each possible rule for each kind of market situation, we
could in principle select the rule that minimizes the expected total
costs across all market situations. The description of this calculation
suggests how infeasible it would be as a practical means of choosing
the "optimal" per se rule.
Not only would it be extremely difficult to arrive at a rule that
would meet with any reasonable consensus, but relying on such a rule
would also reduce the ability to use all the information that is likely
to be available to us. This brings into question the wisdom of sub-
scribing to any single per se rule based on observed firm behavior
alone. Restricting or permitting some particular behavior as a gen-
eral matter may yield economic gains in a few markets, but losses in
many others. A rule based solely on behavioral considerations does
not provide a means for distinguishing market situations in which
the expected costs of predatory pricing are high from those in which
they are low.
The decision-theoretic framework that we have presented suggests
a way of formulating a rule-of-reason approach to predatory pricing
that both preserves the desired flexibility to respond to facts particu-
lar to a given market and minimizes implementation costs. The pri-
mary objective is to design an approach that makes the probability
of a false positive error low when the cost of such an error is high
and that makes the probability of a false negative error low when
the cost of that type of error is high. Since structural factors that raise
the cost of false positive errors lower the cost of false negatives and
vice versa, an approach to predatory pricing should employ standards
that are carefully conditioned on structural factors. Thus, we sug-
gest a two-tier approach that is sensitive to differences in market
structure and allows us to screen out market situations where a
reasonable threat of predatory pricing exists from those where it does
not.60
66. One consideration that appears to have been very important in leading Areeda
and Turner to the cost-based rule they formulate is their view that predatory pricing is
rare in all markets. See Areeda-Turner ProPosal, supra note 1, at 699; Areeda & Turner
on Scherer, sukra note 1, at 894; Areeda & Turner on Williamson, supra note 1, at 1339.
This leads them to a rule that provides some protection against false negative errors, but
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In the first stage, we would examine both the structural char-
acteristics of the market in question and the market power of the
alleged predator firm to find out if they generate a reasonable ex-
pectation that predatory pricing could occur and impose significant
economic losses on society. It is necessary, at this first stage, to form
a judgment about whether the market structure is such that the ex-
pected costs of failing to identify as predatory, pricing behavior that
actually is predatory, are likely to be high. Such a judgment would
be based on consideration of the structural factors we have discussed
above. Unless a reasonable case could be made that there was a serious
monopoly problem in the industry, no detailed investigation of the
alleged predator's intent or behavior, nor speculation about the long-
run consequences of its pricing policy, would be undertaken. In short,
a claim that predatory pricing had taken place could be pursued
only if the plaintiff could show that the market context in which
the behavior was taking place was in fact conducive to predatory
pricing.
We believe that this first-stage "structural" requirement, using
generally accepted definitions of monopoly power, would discourage
frivolous predatory pricing cases. A plaintiff would have to show that
a significant monopoly problem existed in the market and could not
try to supplement weak evidence on the likelihood and effects of pred-
atory pricing by appealing to vague predatory pricing standards
such as "intent" or "below-cost" pricing. Thus, a claim of monopo-
lization through predatory pricing could be pursued only in market
situations in which the structural characteristics suggest that there
is a reasonable probability that monopoly power has been or could
be sustained by the use of price reductions. The concern about in-
curring substantial false positive error costs, by labeling as predatory,
pricing behavior that is not predatory, would be reduced since in-
stances of alleged predation in which such costs were expected to be
greatest would be eliminated by the initial "structural" analysis.
Only those situations in which the costs of false negative errors were
that concentrates on reducing the probability of false positive errors. A similar view
appears to lead Bork to the conclusion that predatory pricing should not constitute an
antitrust violation. See R. BoRx, suPra note 1, at 149-55. Of course, the most effective
way to reduce false positive errors is never to declare a firm's pricing behavior predatory.
However, if a policymaker agreed with Areeda and Turner's empirical guess about the
frequency of predatory pricing in some markets but not in others, he would probably
want to adopt an approach that allowed him to differentiate between these two types
of markets and to examine more closely behavior in those markets in which predatory
pricing seemed most likely.
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expected to be high and the costs of false positive errors low would
make it across the threshold into the second tier.
If Areeda and Turner are correct in their belief that predatory
pricing occurs extremely rarely0 7 then not many market situations
will pass the "structural" threshold. For those that do, the social costs
generated by truly predatory pricing could be reduced by using a
more careful and complete evaluation of the pricing behavior than
could be used if one rule had to apply to all predatory pricing cases.
Our two-tier rule-of-reason approach provides a way of distinguishing
situations where predatory pricing may be a significant empirical
problem from those cases where it will not be. It is based on the view
that the predatory pricing problem can be addressed only by confront-
ing directly the interaction between structural monopoly problems and
behavior that tends to sustain monopoly power. The most effective
way to guard against discouraging pricing behavior that is truly com-
petitive is to screen out those market situations in which truly preda-
tory pricing is unlikely. Such distinctions between the problem cases
and the spurious ones cannot be drawn using only a behavioral rule.
Instead, drawing such lines requires a careful examination of the under-
lying structural characteristics of the firm and industry in question.
Under the two-stage approach suggested by our decision-theoretic
framework, firms in markets where there is no evidence of a significant
monopoly problem can do anything they please with price. Firms in
the remaining markets will know that they are going to have their
behavior scrutinized carefully and that efforts will be made to restrict
them from engaging in activities that slow down the development of
a more competitive marketplace.
A. The First Tier: The Elements of the Structural Analysis
Our earlier discussion outlined the structural factors that might be
used to distinguish the cases in which monopoly problems exist from
those in which they do not. It was not meant to provide an exhaustive
catalogue of the structural factors that the courts might look at in any
particular case. Furthermore, even for those factors that we have dis-
cussed, it may be much more difficult to assemble useful information
on some than on others. As a result, we do not mean to imply that the
plaintiff must show that every structural characteristic indicates that
the costs of a false negative error are high and those of a false positive
are low. Similarly, the defendant does not have to show that every
67. See Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at 699.
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structural characteristic of the market is such that false positive errors
are costly while false negative errors are not. The purpose of the
structural analysis is for the court to obtain an overall picture of the
market in question to determine whether, considering all of the struc-
tural characteristics, on balance the structure of the market is such that
a dominant firm could engage in predatory pricing activity that would
result in significant sacrifices in economic efficiency.
Unfortunately, real markets cannot be readily dichotomized into
"monopoly" markets and "competitive" markets, but are better char-
acterized by a continuum, with some markets close to classical monop-
olies, others close to perfect competition, and most markets some-
where in between. The courts will have to examine the evidence and
determine whether monopoly elements are sufficiently pervasive to
justify additional scrutiny of firm behavior. To illustrate what such an
examination might entail, we supplement our earlier discussion of
structural factors by presenting the following three abstract cases in
which a firm has been accused of predatory pricing.
CASE #1:
(1) Short-run monopoly power:
(a) The firm has seventy percent of the market, and three other firms
each have ten percent.
(b) The dominant firm has consistently been a price leader.68
(c) The number and size distribution of firms has remained fairly con-
stant for ten years.
(d) Sustained profits substantially above the competitive level are evident.
(2) Conditions of entry:
(a) Entry at minimum efficient scale requires investment of over $200
million.
(b) No new firms have entered the market in the past ten years. Previous
entry was by very large firms diversifying.
(c) The firm commands a "premium price" for a product that does not
appear to be different from products produced by its competitors.
(d) The firm engages in substantial amounts of "image" advertising
emphasizing the brand name of the product rather than qualitative dif-
ferences from products produced by competitors.
68. A dominant firm is said to be a price leader if other firms in the relevant market
consider the price set by the dominant firm as the price for the entire market. In such a
market, competitors generally will attempt no independent price changes, but will only
change prices in response to and to the extent that the dominant firm changes prices. If
the market exhibits some product differentiation, then competitors will follow and match
the dominant firm's price plus or minus some differential. See F. SCHERER, supra note 5,
at 164-66.
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(3) Dynamic effects of competition on costs and products:
(a) The three smaller firms in the market are the primary sources of
process and product innovations.
CASE #2:
(1) Short-run monopoly power:
(a) The alleged predator has forty percent of the market and eight
smaller firms of varying sizes comprise the rest.
(b) The firm's market share has been gradually declining over time.
(c) When the firm has tried to "lead" price increases, the demand for
its product has declined substantially.
(d) The firm's profits have been somewhat greater than the cost of
capital over the previous four years, but profitability has been falling.
(2) Conditions of entry:
(a) Entry at minimum efficient scale requires initial investment of $10
million.
(b) Three new firms have entered the market successfully over the past
five years and have grown rapidly. Two others have entered and later
failed.
(c) Products sold by various firms are fairly homogeneous, and ad-
vertising costs are not a substantial fraction of total costs. There is no
evidence that any product enjoys "premium brand" advantage.
(3) Dynamic effects of competition on costs and products:
(a) This product market is not characterized by rapid technological
change.
(b) Technological change that has occurred has focused on new and
improved products, and the dominant firm is the primary creator of new
products.
CASE #3:
(1) Short-run monopoly power:
(a) The alleged predator has sixty percent of the market and four
smaller firms comprise the rest of the market. In some geographical markets
one of the other firms has a larger market share.
(b) The firm's market share has averaged sixty percent over the past ten
years, but the share has fluctuated considerably from year to year.
(c) When the firm has tried to "lead" price increases, the other firms
have sometimes followed, but when they have not, the firm has rolled
back the price increase as the demand for its product declined dramatically.
(d) The firm's profits have on average been somewhat greater than the
cost of capital but show a slight downward trend.
(2) Conditions of entry:
(a) Entry at minimum efficient scale requires investment of at least
$200 million to enter all major geographical markets simultaneously. Entry
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into major geographical submarkets requires initial investment of $20
million.
(b) Three new firms have entered in particular geographical areas over
the past five years, but only one of these still survives.
(c) The market is characterized by some product differentiation and
advertising outlays are above average, but the firm's product does not gen-
erally carry a "premium brand" price.
(3) Dynamic effects of competition on costs and products:
(a) The market is characterized by fairly rapid cost-saving technological
changes.
(b) Both the dominant firm and two of its competitors, one of which is a
recent entrant, have introduced new low-cost production processes.
Recall that at this stage we are not determining whether the firm is
liable, but only whether, on the basis of an overview of structural
factors, there appears to be enough of a monopoly problem that a
further investigation of firm behavior is warranted. This determina-
tion is easy for the first two cases, but difficult for the third. Given the
structural characteristics of case #1, an inquiry into dominant firm
behavior is certainly in order. The market described is exactly the type
in which predatory pricing is most likely to occur, and to result in
significant losses in economic efficiency if entry is not allowed to erode
the monopoly power of the dominant firm.
In case #2, no further inquiry into behavior is necessary. Although
there is some evidence of historical monopoly power, this does not ap-
pear to be a market in which there is a serious long-term monopoly
problem. The competitive process seems to be working efficiently to
erode any monopoly power that may exist. Thus, a predatory pricing
action brought by one of the unsuccessful entrants should be dismissed
without any further inquiry into behavior.
The third case is not as readily characterized as the other two. The
market is less concentrated than in case #1. Although the market share
of the dominant firm has remained fairly high, it is also unstable.
Furthermore, the alleged predator is not dominant in all geographical
markets. Simultaneous entry into all geographical submarkets is very
costly, but it is much less difficult to enter individual submarkets and
one case of successful entry has occurred in this way. There is some
product differentiation, but an entrant does not have to confront a
major entrenched "image" problem. Innovations have been contrib-
uted by both the dominant firm and some of its competitors. How-
ever, there is some evidence that the dominant firm has power over
price and has been able to sustain supranormal profits over a con-
siderable period of time.
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While in case #1 an analysis of behavior is clearly warranted, and in
case #2 it is not, the correct way to proceed in case #3 is less obvious.
In close cases such as this, we believe that the decision to go forward
must ultimately depend upon the court's judgment as to whether a
detailed exploration of behavior will help to provide further informa-
tion about the monopoly power that the dominant firm actually
possesses or might obtain as a result of this behavior.
B. The Second Tier: Behavioral Considerations
In those cases in which the firm-specific and market-specific struc-
tural characteristics suggest that the efficiency losses of failing to iden-
tify, as predatory, pricing that is predatory, are likely to be high, it is
necessary to proceed to the second tier of analysis.
It is presumed that a firm subjected to the behavioral inquiry of the
second stage has substantial market power, which can be exploited by
employing strategic measures to maintain a trajectory of supra-com-
petitive prices for a longer period of time than could be enjoyed with-
out engaging in strategic behavior. Hence, the standard that a de-
fendant firm subject to second-tier analysis should have to satisfy to be
exonerated will be more rigorous than the test one would propose if
the search were for a single behavioral rule to apply to all firms in all
markets; a more detailed scrutiny of structure, behavior, and expected
performance would be conducted in the context of the particular pric-
ing behavior at issue. There is a place in the second-tier analysis of
firm behavior for each of the rules proposed by other recent contrib-
utors to the discussion of predatory pricing.6 9 However, none of these
rules alone provides a satisfactory basis for the second-tier analysis.
What considerations ought, then, to enter into the second-stage anal-
ysis of firm pricing behavior? Merely observing a price cut in the face
of entry or potential entry is clearly insufficient as evidence of predatory
behavior. The destruction of monopoly elements through new com-
69. At this tier the court would undertake a more detailed scrutiny of structure, be-
havior, and expected performance in the context of the particular pricing behavior at
issue than it would conduct at the first tier. The kinds of firm and market characteristics
that Scherer would examine in every predatory pricing case, see Scherer Proposal, supra
note 1, at 890, would be scrutinized in those cases where the reasonable expectation of
substantial false negative error costs led to the second tier of analysis. Elements of the
Areeda-Turner, Williamson, and Baumol rules are incorporated at the second tier. See
pp. 250-58 infra. Note that some commentators have proposed that different rules be
applied in different situations. See, e.g., 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, supra note 1, at 715d
(basic average variable cost test with examination of marginal cost also in some situa-
tions); Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at 331-37 (proposing output-restriction rule,
average variable cost test, and average total cost test at various points in litigation).
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petition should lead to a reduction in prices from monopoly levels,
and these price decreases will almost necessarily have an adverse effect
upon other firms in the market 70-whether they are entrants or existing
firms. Competitive price cuts should proceed as rapidly as possible,
consistent with the demand and supply conditions in the market, and
should be sustained as competition gradually replaces monopoly or
oligopoly. On the other hand, a price cut that serves only to drive com-
petitors from the market or to delay the entry of new competitors and
that is ultimately replaced with a monopoly price once competition
has been eliminated is clearly undesirable. Although given the struc-
tural characteristics of a market, we could, in theory, derive a socially
optimal trajectory of prices and entry of new competitors, the solution
to this theoretical inquiry cannot form the basis of a practical, work-
able monopoly policy. 7 1 Certain types of pricing behavior, however,
can be identified as most unlikely components of such a socially op-
timal trajectory of prices, outputs, and entry.
1. Pricing Below Average Variable Cost
Areeda and Turner have argued that a price cut to a point below
short-run marginal cost is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
showing predation.7 2 Because short-run marginal cost is nearly im-
possible to measure in the context of antitrust litigation, Areeda and
Turner recommended that reasonably anticipated average variable
cost be used as a surrogate.7 3 They appended two qualifications: that
reasonably disputed items be treated as variable costs, 74 and that de-
fendants be allowed to rely on average variable cost only when they
offer evidence indicating that average variable cost is not significantly
70. At least one court has displayed sensitivity to this point. See Janich Bros. v.
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
71. The derivation of this socially optimal trajectory requires the specification and
solution of an extremely complicated dynamic programming problem encompassing the
dynamic characteristics of demand and supply, the conditions and determinants of entry,
and various proposed antitrust constraints. Even the simpler problem of determining the
dynamic behavior of a monopoly firm that attempts to maximize long-run profits subject
to a simple specification of entry by other firms but not subject to any antitrust con-
straints is difficult and complex. See Gaskins, supra note 5.
72. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATIsE, suPra note 1, 711a; Areeda-Turner Proposal,
supra note I, at 709-16. Areeda and Turner, howeier, do admit an exception to their
rule: price below short-run marginal cost should not be held predatory if the firm is
pricing at or above average total cost. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATIsE, supra note 1,
711d, 715b; Areeda-Turner Proposal, supra note 1, at 713.
73. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, suPra note 1, 715d; Areeda-Turner Proposal,
supra note 1, at 716-18.
74. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATiSE, supra note 1, 715c; Areeda & Turner on William-
son, supra note 1, at 1338.
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below short-run marginal cost.75 Many of the courts that have applied
the Areeda-Turner rule have used the "average variable cost" ap-
proximation and not devoted much attention to measuring short-run
marginal cost. 76
Average variable cost will always be below average total cost and,
except when there is substantial excess capacity, below short-run mar-
ginal cost as well. A price below average variable cost will never be
profit-maximizing in the short run for an existing firm with monopoly
power, and it is likely to be below the long-run average cost and long-
run marginal cost of an equally efficient rival. Thus, a price cut to a
point below average variable cost can have no purpose other than the
sacrifice of short-run profits for long-run monopoly gain.77 Note that
75. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, supra note 1, 715d; Areeda & Turner on William-
son, supra note 1, at 1338.
76. See, e.g., Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 858-59 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior
Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
In contrast, in one recent case, the court concluded that pricing below average variable
cost could not be used to show that predatory pricing had occurred. See William Inglis &
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 418-19 (N.D. Cal.
1978). The court was evaluating allegations of predatory pricing in the industry that
produced and distributed bread in Northern California. Plaintiffs showed that the de-
fendant company had priced considerably below average variable cost. Id. at 418. The
court noted that at the relevant times there was considerable excess capacity in both the
production and distribution of bread, with the result that average variable cost would
be "substantially higher than marginal cost." Id. at 418. Areeda and Turner had stated
that, where such a disparity exists, average variable cost "is the correct test on principle,
since a firm that sells below its average variable cost is clearly not loss-minimizing." 3
AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, supra note , 715d. The Inglis court, however, did not
apply the Areeda-Turner average variable cost rule and offered two arguments for not
doing so. First, if it is "evident in a particular case that profit maximization will occur
at marginal, but below average variable cost, [then average variable cost] cannot be used
as prima facie proof of a violation." 461 F. Supp. at 418-19. Second, there is "no necessity
for use of the surrogate," average variable cost, where it is possible to determine marginal
cost with equal accuracy. Id. at 419. Because the plaintiff had failed "to adduce com-
petent evidence of sales below marginal cost," the court struck down the jury verdict for
the plaintiff on the Sherman Act § 2 predatory pricing issue. Id. at 419.
77. There is an exception that should be mentioned, though we believe it will apply
in only very rare cases. It rests on dynamic considerations that suggest that the excess
capacity is temporary and that the start-up costs incurred in the future when full-scale
production resumes will be much greater if the firm ceases production now than if it
stays in business even though not covering its variable costs. A possible example of this
situation is a mine in an industry where excess capacity is currently so great that firms
can only produce at a point where price is less than average variable cost. But at the
same time, significant damage might be done if the mine were closed-for example, the
mine might be flooded-so that there would be large costs of reopening the mine when
the temporary period of industry excess capacity had passed. An excess-capacity defense
to pricing below average variable cost might be warranted in such a case.
The considerations discussed at pp. 252-54 infra concerning a defense of a price below
average total cost also apply here. But unlikely as it is that the excess-capacity defense
will apply in the instance of pricing below average total cost, it is even less likely to be
applicable when price is found to be below average variable cost.
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our reasoning to this conclusion about the status of pricing below
average variable cost is different from that of Areeda and Turner.
Their analysis and conclusion are based on static microeconomic
models and associated concerns with short-run efficiency considera-
tions.78 Since the essence of the predatory pricing problem is dynamic,
a static perspective is inadequate. We are trying to use short-run static
behavior to infer longer-run intent and consequences.
Therefore, the adoption of a strategy of pricing below average vari-
able cost by a dominant firm confronted with entry is sufficient to
demonstrate predation. A price below average variable cost, and for
that matter, a price below average total cost, could not possibly be
sustained in the long run since, to survive, firms must cover total costs
in the long run. A firm with market power-the ability to control
price-would only have an incentive to impose losses on itself when
faced with an entrant if the promise of future monopoly gains made
such a tactic profitable from a long-run perspective.
2. Pricing Between Average Variable Cost and Average Total Cost
Although pricing below average variable cost is a sufficient condi-
tion for establishing predatory behavior, we do not believe it should
be a necessary condition. Pricing between average variable cost and
average total cost also may indicate predation.
In a competitive market, the equilibrium market price will equal
the average total cost of production,7 9 including a normal rate of re-
turn on capital invested,80 and this will, in turn, equal long-run mar-
78. See note 4 supra.
79. For a single-product firm, average total cost is easily defined. In the more likely
multiproduct context, we are using "average total cost" to signify the average incremental
cost of the commodity of concern and not any arbitrary "fully allocated cost measure."
See Baumol, supra note 1, at 9 n.26 (high likelihood that most cases will involve multi-
product firms; arbitrary and difficult to fully allocate cost among products). Baumol de-
fines the "average incremental cost" of product X "as total company cost minus what the
total cost of the company would be in the absence of production of X, all divided by the
quantity of X being produced." Id.
In using an average total cost test, courts will have to make some effort to guard
against "creative accounting." This will be especially difficult in the case of multi-
product firms where the relevant average total cost figure is the average incremental
cost of the commodity with respect to which predatory pricing is alleged. In calculating
this average total cost, the court may look first to the firm's allocation of "overhead"
costs as a guide, though we would urge that such guidance be sought only with extreme
caution. If the firm's allocations are examined, a minimal requirement should be that
preentry, not post-entry, cost allocations be used.
80. Some imputation of a normal rate of return on capital must be included in the
average total cost figure. This will generally be lower than the dominant firm's his-
torical rate of return on capital. Since the computation of a normal rate of return on
capital is complex and uncertain, it may be desirable to take the average rate of return
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ginal cost. Of course, prices in a competitive market will fluctuate over
time, sometimes rising above and sometimes falling below this com-
petitive standard, as short-run variations occur in demand and supply
conditions. But it is highly unlikely that the socially optimal trajectory
of prices and entry in any market initially characterized by monopoly
or oligopoly would involve immediate post-entry prices that impose a
loss on the dominant firm. A price below average total cost could drive
equally efficient and perhaps even more efficient rivals from the
market or deter such firms from entering; in the face of entry lags, the
dominant firm could then resume its monopoly pricing behavior. Al-
though a dominant firm maximizing only short-run profits would
probably lower its price in response to entry or the threat of entry, it
would not decrease its price to a level below average total cost.
Hence, we would recommend that if the firm-specific and market-
specific structural characteristics considered in the first stage of our
proposed inquiry lead to an examination of the defendant firm's be-
havior, then, at the second stage, a price response that does not cover
average total cost should be presumed predatory unless the dominant
firm can show that this strategy maximizes short-run profits.
The short-run profit-maximization defense is likely to be valid in
only one situation-when substantial excess production capacity exists
in the industry. This condition might arise for one of three reasons:
first, the alleged predator may be operating in a declining industry;
second, the entrant may have entered at a scale sufficiently large that,
at a price equal to average total cost, total industry capacity would be
underutilized; and third, the dominant firm may follow a conscious
strategy of carrying excess capacity so as to deter entry.81 The dominant
firm would be allowed to defend its pricing decisions by proving that
either of the first two circumstances existed. - But the alleged predator
would not be allowed an exception to the average total cost rule in the
for manufacturing industries in the United States as a starting point in making this
imputation and to require an affirmative showing that a different value is more appro-
priate for the firm in question. In this regard, it should be clear that profit calculations
based on computations of rates of return on sales or similar markup criteria are inappro-
priate and are likely to lead to incorrect conclusions.
81. See Spence, supra note 50; Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at 294.
82. In Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977), an unanticipated decline in demand for a chemical product
resulted in significant excess capacity in the industry only a few years after bright pros-
pects had induced large-scale entry by several firms. 551 F.2d at 791-92. The dominant
firm held price below its average total cost but above both its marginal cost and its average
variable cost. Id. at 797. The court found no antitrust violation, arguing that the dominant
firm had simply engaged in price competition in the face of excess capacity that had
resulted from an unanticipated drop in demand. See id. at 796-97.
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third case, in which the industry's immediate post-entry excess capacity
was the result of the dominant firm's conscious strategy of carrying
preentry excess capacity. In line with Williamson's analysis, the domi-
nant firm could not defend its price reduction on the grounds of excess
capacity if the record showed that it had increased its own output in
the face of entry.83
With regard to the comparison between the alleged predator's price
and its costs, one may wonder why we even mention average variable
cost. Since average variable cost is always below average total cost, it
would appear to be redundant to look at the former as well as the
latter: any price that is below average variable cost will be below
average total cost and can be held predatory on that ground. However,
we view the average variable cost standard as a quick check of the
alleged predatory pricing behavior. Since average variable cost is likely
to be easier to calculate8 4 than average total cost and since a price cut
to so low a level is obviously predatory, it makes sense to look at this
threshold first. However, a price cut to below average total cost remains
the primary cost standard at the second tier.
3. Pricing Above Average Total Cost
At least in theory, a price cut to a point above average total cost in
response to entry could be predatory because such a price cut could
represent a sacrifice of short-run profits for longer-run monopoly
gain.8  However, as is not true for a dominant firm's price cuts to
83. See Williamson Proposal, supra note 1, at 307-10 (superior welfare properties of
output-restriction rule that bars dominant firm from strategically carrying excess capacity).
84. Average total cost is likely to be more difficult to calculate than average variable
cost for two primary reasons. First, a calculation of average total cost requires calculating
the appropriate elements of fixed costs as well as all the elements of average variable costs.
Second, calculating fixed cost elements often raises significant difficulties. Accounting data
on fixed costs include costs of management or facilities that may be used for producing
goods other than those of concern in a predatory pricing case. The correct imputation of
fixed costs requires the calculation of average incremental cost. See note 79 supra. This
will involve a significant amount of additional calculation because one must ascertain
what a company's cost would be if it did not produce a certain product.
As Professor Williamson has noted, the calculation of average variable costs also pre-
sents difficulties that have been widely recognized by most commentators concerned with
cost-based tests. See Williamson Response, supra note 1, at 1196; Williamson Proposal,
supra note 1, at 312 & nn. 70-72. In particular, the process of deciding which costs are
variable and which are fixed will be a difficult one; the required line-drawing about the
nature of costs makes average variable cost harder to calculate than it might, at first
glance, seem to be. See 3 AREEDA-TURNER TREATISE, supra note 1, 715c; cf. Areeda &
Turner on Williamson, supra note 1, at 1338 (disputes in defining which costs are "vari-
able" should be resolved by somewhat arbitrary rules; most disputed items should be
assigned to the variable cost category).
85. For example, consider the following set of conditions: capital markets are im-
perfect, information flows concerning the riskiness of entry are poor, potential entrants
have "thin" capital bases, and production involves high start-up costs as well as sub-
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levels below average total cost, which almost always reflect a departure
from short-run profit maximization, no practical way exists to dis-
tinguish a predatory price cut to a point above average total cost from
one that is a short-run profit-maximizing response to the growth of
competition. It would be impossible to fashion a simple formula that
the courts could utilize effectively and that firms could rely on with
assurance in making pricing decisions. Any effort to define such a
formula runs the serious risk of restricting truly competitive price
cuts; that is, it engenders a high probability of making false positive
errors. Consequently, considerable caution must be exercised before
labeling as predatory any price cut that leaves the price above average
total cost.
We propose that such price reductions be treated as follows. A price
decrease to a point above average total cost would be presumed to be
legal unless the price cut were reversed either fully or to a significant
extent within a reasonable period of time-for example, two years. In
the event of withdrawal of a price reduction, the burden of proof would
shift to the dominant firm, which would have to show that the price
increase was justified by independent increases in the costs of produc-
tion or independent changes in demand. This approach is essentially
the one advocated by Baumol; 0 it helps to ensure that dominant firm
price reductions subsequent to a rival's entry are competitive actions
and thus sustainable, rather than predatory moves principally aimed
at cementing monopoly power. Note, however, that the "predatory
process" would have to run its course before a successful claim could be
made. In this regard, allegations of predatory pricing behavior that
point to price cuts that fall below average variable cost or below
average total cost are different from price cuts that do not. Neverthe-
less, if the "sustained price reduction" test is implemented successfully,
the dominant firm will have strong incentives to make only those price
cuts it intends to maintain.
4. Relationships Among Second-Tier Tests
It might appear that the sustained pricing test renders the cost-based
tests redundant. As a theoretical matter, focusing on a single product
stantial cost savings over time associated with "learning by doing." Then an existing
dominant firm could deter entry by cutting its price to a level that is below the im-
mediate post-entry costs of production of new firms but above its own average total cost.
By holding its price at such a level, the dominant firm could inflict losses on any new
entrant while still earning a profit itself. The dominant firm would be able, by below-
entry-cost pricing, to deter entry, even though if these other firms were to enter, then
as their output expanded and learning by doing took place, their production costs would
quite likely fall to those of the existing firm.
86. See Baumol, supra note 1, at 4-6.
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being sold in a single geographical market, this is probably true. 7 As
a practical matter, there are a variety of reasons why the cost-based
inquiries should continue to be an integral part of the behavioral in-
quiry at the second tier. First, the dominant firm whose behavior is
under review may be operating in many geographical markets. A new
firm may find it necessary to enter the industry sequentially by starting
in a small number of geographical markets first with the intention of
expanding into others."" A dominant firm could respond to this entry
by setting prices below average total cost at these entry points, driving
the entrant from the market, and then leaving the prices below cost,
both prices and costs adjusted for inflation, for the two-year period.
By sustaining losses in a few geographical markets for a couple of years,
while maintaining monopoly prices in the others, the firm could sub-
stantially reduce the rate of competitive entry over the full range of
geographical markets. Such anticompetitive behavior would not be dis-
covered by a behavioral inquiry that focused only on whether the
dominant firm sustained its price cut for a previously stipulated period
of time. However, an examination of the relation between the firm's
price and its average total cost in the entry markets would curb such
anticompetitive pricing strategies.
Analogously, the defendant firm may produce many related products.
A new rival may find it difficult to raise the capital necessary to enter
across the broad spectrum of products produced by the dominant firm.
Once again, sequential entry may be an attractive strategy. The new
firm would enter by producing a small subset of the products at much
lower initial investment, and would then expand its product line as
acceptance by customers and credibility in the financial community
increase. The dominant firm could deter entry by blocking the "entry
points"; by lowering prices for products in challenged markets below
average total cost, the firm could drive the entrant from the market,
maintain prices for the required length of time, and thereby sub-
stantially reduce the rate of entry at relatively modest cost to itself.
87. Professor Baumol suggests that an argument can be made that even in a multi-
product, multimarket setting, no supplementary cost test is needed. By requiring that any
price cut be quasi-permanent, firms establishing prices below cost will face "an auto-
matic penalty sufficient to make [them] voluntarily avoid predatory pricing." Id. at 10.
Nevertheless, Baumol recognizes that such an argument "may leave some observers un-
comfortable," id., because they may "believe that the management of a very profitable
firm may prefer, even for long periods, to use some of the profits contributed by other
outputs as a source to subsidize socially unacceptable low prices of products threatened
by entry," id. Thus, Baumol suggests that his policy of quasi-permanent price reductions
be supplemented by a cost test to prevent cross-subsidization. Id.
88. See, e.g., Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979).
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The sustained price reduction test alone would not suffice to deter such
an approach; the average total cost test would enjoin it.
As a final example, consider a dominant firm that operates in a
market characterized by rapid product innovation. In such a market, a
product that is successful today may be superseded by a new and better
one in a very short period of time. Thus, the dominant firm could drive
an entrant from the market by charging prices below average total cost
for a single generation of products with the aim of maintaining its
monopoly power over future generations of products. Successful entry
today might have ensured competition over all future generations of
products; preventing entry today may result in future monopoly.s9
The established firm would recoup its short-run losses on today's
product by charging monopoly prices on tomorrow's product. However,
the "price increases" would occur on different products. Therefore, if
the firm's structural characteristics and those of the market it serves
have led to a second-stage analysis of its pricing behavior, further
examination asking only whether the dominant firm had sustained for
the required period of time its price cut on today's product would not
prevent its predatory actions. In contrast, cost-based tests would be
more effective in detecting such anticompetitive practices.
In each of these instances, a behavioral inquiry focused solely on
whether a price cut has been maintained may fail to detect, and hence
to stop, predatory behavior. It is critical to recognize that actual markets
can be far more complicated than static or dynamic theoretical models
of single-product, single-market firms imply. Entry strategies un-
doubtedly will differ from one market to the next as the supply and
demand characteristics of the markets vary. Naturally, as a consequence,
the entry deterrence strategies of dominant firms in the different mar-
kets will vary in response. Indeed, our empirical guess would be that
firms that fail the first-tier structural standard and thereby make a be-
havioral inquiry necessary are far more likely to be operating in com-
plex markets than in simple ones. Hence, we believe that the sustained
price test, although perhaps adequate for assessing alleged predation in
89. Consider the computer example presented above. See note 45 supra. Suppose that
the sequential entry strategy is the easiest way for new firms to enter this market, but that
the individual segments are themselves characterized by rapid technological change with
new generations of products introduced in each segment every few years. By "permanent-
ly" reducing prices to levels such that entrants lose money on the current generation of
products, the dominant firm may be able to make entry more costly or induce exit in the
hope that competition will be reduced over future generations of products. A price re-
duction may thereby be sustained over one generation of products but competition may
be reduced over future generations if the real or perceived costs of entry are increased as
a result of this kind of pricing behavior.
HeinOnline -- 89 Yale L.J. 257 1979-1980
The Yale Law Journal
relatively static single-product national markets, is not sufficient, by
itself, as a general predatory pricing policy; it should be joined with
cost-based tests to form a sound second-stage examination of the de-
fendant firm's behavior.
C. Overview of the Two-Tier Approach
Our proposed approach does not force large industrial firms to create
and maintain an uneconomic price umbrella in the markets they serve.
For most firms in the economy, the first, structural tier of our approach
will eliminate any judicial inquiry into pricing behavior. A firm that
is subject to a second-stage examination of its pricing will have com-
plete freedom to reduce its prices to the level that would prevail in the
long run in a competitive market, and even below that if an excess-
capacity or declining-industry case can be demonstrated.90 Such price
reductions could be challenged only if they were later reversed in an
exercise of monopoly power made possible by the diminished com-
petition in the market.
The message our proposed behavioral inquiry would convey to firms
with monopoly power is that they should not use that power to main-
tain their dominant positions. They will know that price cuts below
average variable cost will be viewed as clear predatory acts, that prices
below average total cost will establish a presumption of predation, and
that other price cuts will be questioned only if subsequent increases are
not justified by changes in cost or demand conditions. We believe these
criteria are sufficiently well-defined that they can be utilized effectively
to identify predatory behavior in both government cases and private
treble damage actions. Furthermore, their implementation does not
require an extensive investigation into the intent of the various pricing
responses to entry.
Our emphasis at the second tier is on the application of a rule of
reason to the analysis of allegedly predatory price cuts once the
presence of monopoly power has been established. The substantive
content of this second-stage examination of pricing behavior is, in
a sense, a selective combination of the rules proposed by Areeda and
Turner, Baumol, and Williamson. Pricing below average variable
cost constitutes, as Areeda and Turner proposed, a sufficient condition
for finding predation. However, under our approach, below-cost pric-
ing is not necessary for predation. Instead, we apply Baumol's "quasi-
permanent price reduction" rule, and supplement it with the cost-
90. See pp. 252-54 supra.
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based tests, to identify predatory behavior. In particular, Williamson's
"backstop" average total cost test is an intrinsic part of the second-stage
behavioral inquiry we propose. Finally, Williamson's output-restriction
rule is reflected in our limitation of the excess-capacity defense to a
charge of predatory pricing.
The approach that we have outlined does not preclude the ex-
amination of other evidence that could inform the court about the
intent and effects of the pricing behavior, especially if the price and
cost analysis turns out to be ambiguous. Although we are sympathetic
to the concerns that have been expressed about the use of internal
memoranda and statements of executives to show "intent,"91 we do
not believe that such information is useless. However, the use of
such information should be structured around two basic questions:
1) Does the documentary evidence clearly indicate that the firm
with monopoly power plans to increase its prices once the competition
has been driven from the market?
2) Does the documentary evidence clearly indicate an effort to use
price cuts as a mechanism to increase artificially the difficulty of
entering the market?
We are not here referring to random documents indicating a desire
to "crush" or "kill" competitors. Rather we are looking for carefully
constructed long-run plans to maintain monopoly power by reducing
the number of firms in the market and making the entry of new firms
more difficult. We doubt that such clear tracks will frequently be left
by a dominant firm, but if they are, the courts should not ignore
them.92
91. See POSNER Boox, supra note 1, at 189-90 ("availability of evidence of improper
intent is often a function of luck and of the defendant's legal sophistication, not of the
underlying reality"; company with "executives sensitized to antitrust problems will not
leave any documentary trail of improper intent").
92. The inquiry we have described as constituting the second stage of our two-tier
analysis is directed solely at the pricing behavior of the defendant firm since price setting
has been the focus of our discussion. As we remarked earlier though, pricing policy is
only one instrument of strategic behavior that can be used to establish and maintain
monopoly power. As both we and Williamson have emphasized, each predatory pricing
standard will engender a strategic adaptation by the dominant firm, which must be con-
sidered when evaluating the costs of implementing a particular policy. Allegations of
predatory pricing have often been accompanied by charges that the defendant firm has
also engaged in other predatory activities of a nonprice nature. The latter have included,
for example, "targeted" advertising expenditures, "false" product announcements, and
product "manipulations."
Increased advertising effort, new product announcements, and product modifications
can be nonpredatory responses to competitive entry. But there exists no simple test to
determine, as a general matter, whether they promote the interests of consumers and
yield true social benefits or merely make it difficult for a new entrant to appear or to
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D. Procedural Issues
Although we do not develop detailed procedures for implementing
this two-tier approach to predatory pricing cases, it seems clear that
the approach will entail some procedural reforms. We would like to
sketch briefly a procedure that may be useful in implementing our
approach.
One of the major problems with antitrust cases is that they become
extremely time-consuming and complicated. Moreover, in many cases,
it seems, a significant amount of discovery resources are devoted to
developing the behavioral issues in the case, rather than the structural
facts relevant to the firms and markets that are affected. Reliance on
vague notions of "intent" lead to massive discovery efforts by the plain-
tiff to find documents indicating that the defendant was out to
"eliminate" the plaintiff. At trial, each party devotes a substantial
amount of time and effort to presenting and explaining this evidence.
When the case is tried before a jury, the evaluation of this con-
flicting evidence becomes especially difficult.
The positive role the antitrust laws can play in promoting competi-
tion is gradually being diminished by burdensome discovery and trial
processes that appear to increase both the degree of due process and
the information available to judges and juries, but that may actually
lead to more arbitrary decisions. We believe that our two-tier approach
can make this process less time-consuming, less costly, and less com-
plex without sacrificing the quality of the ultimate decisions.
The analysis of the structural characteristics of the market can be
conducted in the context of a much shorter and more focused discovery
and trial process. Much of the structural evidence required is available
from public sources; the balance of the requisite evidence could be
obtained using narrow discovery techniques aimed at developing spe-
cific factual questions regarding industry structure. Similarly, at trial,
the structural information can be evaluated with specific structural
questions in mind. As a result, it would be reasonable to consider
implementing the two-tier approach by having a short, focused dis-
covery period followed by a separate preliminary trial that concen-
trated exclusively on issues of structural monopoly. If a plaintiff could
not convince the judge or jury that there was a reasonable expectation
that a serious monopoly problem existed, then the case would be dis-
survive. Since, however, firms subject to the second-tier inquiry have been prescreened so
that the only market contexts considered are those in which monopoly power is a serious
problem, the courts should admit and evaluate evidence as to the effects of such be-
havior on consumer welfare.
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missed without any discovery or trial on behavioral issues. Thus, the
entire process could be completed within a year or two of the initial
complaint.
If the plaintiff did prevail in the initial trial, a second trial focused
on issues of liability and relief would have to be conducted. But the
time, expense, and confusion that issues of behavior raise would now
have to be incurred only in that subset of monopoly cases where the
structural threshold was satisfied. In addition, the task of inferring
illegal behavior from the documentary record will be eased for judges
and juries once an initial determination has been made that a serious
monopoly problem exists and the evaluation of dominant firm behavior
is conducted taking that determination as given.
A second procedural issue remains to be considered: If a case reaches
the second, behavioral tier, which party bears the burden of proving
that a price cut did or did not satisfy any of the conditions for preda-
tion? Any cost-based test creates a tremendous evidentiary burden on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not ordinarily know what the de-
fendant's costs of production are, and cost evidence obtained through
discovery may be incomplete or difficult to understand. Furthermore,
the intelligent dominant firm may be able to "cover its tracks" by
using accounting techniques that can make any price cut appear
remunerative. Hence, it may be difficult or impossible for the plaintiff
and the court to ascertain the real costs.
As a result, the effective implementation of our two-tier approach
requires that once a defendant has been shown to have monopoly
power, it must bear a burden of production. This would include the
provision of cost studies that would ordinarily be found in the files
through discovery as well as detailed descriptions of the bases of the
cost studies and the accounting techniques used in developing cost
estimates. The failure to maintain or produce such evidence should
lead to a presumption that the price cut was predatory. The firm that
had been found to possess monopoly power would then have the
burden of showing that the price reduction was not predatory.93 If the
93. This burden of production requires only that dominant firms routinely perform
analyses of their costs of production and maintain these analyses along with adequate
documentation in their files. Without such a burden of production a dominant firm may
be able to evade the application of any cost-based tests by making cost information un-
available or incomprehensible. A dominant firm should not be allowed to impose an
"information failure" on the process and thereby avoid liability.
A recent case illustrates the difficulty engendered by such information failures in the
application of cost-based tests. In In re Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube,
United States International Trade Commission Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (Feb. 22, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as I.T.C. Steel Case and cited by specific opinion], the International
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defendant satisfies the burden of production, the plaintiff would bear
the burden of proving the price cut was predatory.
IV. The Two-Tier Approach in Context
A. Advantage of the Two-Tier Inquiry
The two-tier nature of the proposed approach to predatory pricing
allows resources for antitrust enforcement to be targeted where they
will produce the greatest social efficiency gains. The sequential aspect
of the examination is at least as important, however, because it avoids
the kind of questionable outcomes produced by an inquiry that focuses
only on behavior without first considering issues of market structure
Trade Commission found eleven Japanese manufacturers to have engaged in the unfair
competitive practice of pricing below average variable cost. See pp. 263-64 infra (dis-
cussing substance of allegation of predatory pricing).
The plurality opinion of Commissioners Minchew, Moore, and Alberger and the con-
curring opinion of Commissioner Ablondi emphasized the respondents' lack of coopera-
tion and failure to participate in the investigation. In particular, average variable cost
data for the Japanese producers were not made available to the hearing officer. As a
result, unaudited calculations of average variable costs of domestic producers were
averaged and that average was imputed to the respondent manufacturers and used as a
proxy for the respondents' costs. Furthermore, comprehensive transaction price data were
unavailable for the particular firms accused of anticompetitive behavior. The Commission
staff compiled the basic evidence on prices from questionnaires sent to domestic distributors
and domestic importers of welded stainless steel pipe and tube; the resulting price data
pertained to the lowest price each domestic distributor paid per quarter for each type of
product and could not always be reliably attributed to a given foreign manufacturer.
See I.T.C. Steel Case, supra, Plurality Opinion at 25 ("many importers received sales from
two or more foreign sources, and .. . the importers were only required to report the
names of suppliers, not their prices.').
The Commission attempted, on the basis of the secondary price and cost information,
"to attribute the lowest sale price in each quarter by each importer to the imputed costs
of production of this article." Id. at 25-26. Because the prices so derived were found to
be below the imputed average variable cost in a large number of cases, the Commission
held that eleven of the respondents had engaged in unfair methods of competition or
unfair acts. Since the respondents did not offer any evidence of a plausible defense for
their practices, the Commission concluded that the rebuttable presumption of predatory
intent had to be applied. Id. at 33.
The dissenting commissioners, Parker and Bedell, concluded to the contrary that "the
evidence in this investigation does not contain adequate proof that the importation and
sale of welded stainless steel pipe and tube were made by any respondents at prices
which were below their respective average variable costs of production over a sustained
period." I.T.C. Steel Case, supra, Dissenting Opinion at 5. While the commissioners on
the plurality opinion defended their use of the secondary evidence, they did emphasize
their inference from the respondents' failure to participate "that facts might have been
produced that would have been adverse to them on the issue of unfair methods or
acts." I.T.C. Steel Case, supra, Plurality Opinion at 26. In his concurring opinion, Com-
missioner Ablondi also decried the nature of the secondary evidence. Rather than relying
on such infirm data, he argued for the more direct conclusion "that the [respondents']
failure to comply with discovery in this investigation justifies a presumption of violation,
and that is a basis for my decision." I.T.C. Steel Case, supra, Concurring Opinion at 6.
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and monopoly power. A recent decision illustrates that such outcomes
can emerge even if the behavioral rule applied is as simple as the
"pricing below average variable cost" version of the Areeda-Turner
standard.
In a recent case before the United States International Trade Com-
mission, 94 eleven Japanese manufacturers were found to have engaged
in the unfair competitive practice of predatory pricing for selling cer-
tain welded stainless steel pipe and tube "at prices lower than the
average variable cost of production ... without commercial justifica-
tion."0 5
The Commission relied heavily on the Areeda-Turner rule, using
average variable cost as a proxy for reasonably anticipated marginal
cost. Neither the presiding officer nor the Commission itself adopted
a per se rule, which would have held that sales below average variable
cost are conclusively predatory.96 Rather, they found that although
sales below average variable cost raised a strong presumption of preda-
tory intent, the presumption should be rebuttable.97
The contention in the case was that some respondents had unilat-
erally set their prices below reasonably anticipated marginal costs. No
evidence was presented to indicate that there was a monopoly problem
in the industry. Indeed, the plurality opinion held that application of
the below-average variable cost rule to raise a rebuttable presumption
of predatory intent does not depend on a showing of monopoly power.98
In fact, the large number of firms supplying the United States market
combined with the fact that the presiding officer dropped all allega-
tions that the Japanese firms had engaged in joint action, combination,
contract, or conspiracy99 in restraint of trade, suggests that there prob-
ably was not a monopoly problem.
The Commission acknowledged that imports, when aggregated, con-
stituted a relatively small percentage of the domestic market. 100 It in-
dicated, however, that this fact was "unimportant" because imports
94. I.T.C. Steel Case, supra note 93.
95. Id., Plurality Opinion at 1.
96. Id. at 21.
97. See id. at 21-22. Three of the six commissioners indicated that "there are too many
economic variables in the steel industry to adopt a per se rule." Id. at 22. Furthermore,
they found that there is a "significantly greater number of plausible justifications for
pricing between ATC and AVC than for pricing below AVC," and hence "sales above
AVC but below average total costs must be supported by evidence of subjective intent
before this Commission can find them to be unfair within the meaning of Section 337."
Id. at 22-23.
98. See id. at 23.
99. See id. at 18.
100. See id. at 37.
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were significant in the maintenance of competition in the American
market.1 1 The Commission concluded that selling at prices below
average variable cost, as it found certain Japanese firms had done, was
"an unfair act which has the tendency to restrain trade and commerce
in the United States by substantially reducing the domestic market
share of other foreign competitors."'' 0 2 The fact that all Japanese
welded stainless steel pipe and tube imports (not just those of the
"predators") had risen to eighty-seven percent of total imports in 1976
from seventy percent in 1974 was crucial to the decision, even though,
as the Commission acknowledged, this was a very small proportion
of the total American market. 0 3 Furthermore, the decision did not
cite any evidence that conditions of entry in this industry were con-
ducive to monopoly.
The plurality opinion dismissed the Justice Department's argument
that unilateral below-cost selling by a nondominant firm is not an
"unfair method of competition"'1 4 encompassed by the section of the
legislation under which the case was brought. The three commissioners
also found without merit the Department's contentions that imports
had had a restraining effect on price, and that, therefore, excluding
Japanese imports would raise consumer prices and not promote price
competition. 10 5 They applied the average variable cost rule and de-
termined that eleven of the respondent Japanese firms had engaged
in predatory pricing, an unfair method of competition.
The Commission's decision appears to have protected particular
competitors at the expense of competition. The beneficiaries of the
cease and desist order issued by the Commission would be not only
other foreign producers but also domestic producers. The restrictive
impact of the decision on foreign competition, which the Justice De-
partment had argued that it would have, only could have enhanced
any market power domestic producers already enjoyed. They, not
consumers, were the beneficiaries. Thus, even the simple average
variable cost version of the Areeda-Turner rule can be misused if an
effort is not made initially to determine whether the structural char-
acteristics of the firms and markets involved generate a reasonable ex-
pectation that monopoly power has been or could be exercised by the
alleged predator.
Applying our two-tier approach, the case, as presented in the Com-
101. See id.
102. Id. at 39 (emphasis supplied).
103. id. at 36-37.
104. Id. at 17 n.1.
105. Id. at 46.
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mission's discussion, would not have satisfied the structural criteria of
the first stage; it would have been dismissed without reaching the
second-tier behavioral analysis.
B. Consistency with Current Views
The two-tier approach we have proposed structures the inquiry about
the defendant firm's pricing in a way that is consistent with the
Supreme Court's current characterization of a violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act. The Court stated, in United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,10 that
[t]he offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acurfien, or historic
accident. 107
As in the two-tier approach we have suggested, the first element of the
Grinnell test asks whether the firm has monopoly power. The second
element in Grinnell inquires whether the firm has engaged in willful
acts of monopolization to acquire or maintain its monopoly power and
thus focuses on the firm's behavior just as the second tier of our ap-
proach does.
There are two principal differences between our proposed two-tier
analysis and the way the Grinnell statement has been applied. First,
our approach puts the two aspects of the Grinnell characterization on
different planes. The inquiry into behavior is reached only if it has
been demonstrated that structural characteristics yield a reasonable
expectation that substantial monopoly power has been or could be ex-
ploited by the alleged predator. Absent such a demonstration at the
first tier, no inquiry is undertaken into the firm's behavior.
The second difference between our approach and the Grinnell char-
acterization is that, in our analysis, the first stage would include a
more detailed and more explicit consideration of the variety of struc-
tural factors that determine the degree of monopoly power. Although
courts have gone beyond evidence on market share in approaching
the question of whether a firm has monopoly power, they generally
have not undertaken the detailed consideration and analysis of the
structural characteristics-including indications of short-run monopoly
106. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
107. Id. at 570-71.
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power, conditions of entry, and the dynamic effects of entrants and
competitors-intrinsic to the first stage of our proposed approach. 08
Some of these structural characteristics have been discussed when
courts applying the Grinnell test have moved to the question of willful
acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power. 09 Hence, one can
view our proposal as an effort to shift some of the detailed analysis that
might take place in addressing the second element of the Grinnell test
to the first tier of the inquiry, and to require a more demanding resolu-
tion of the structural issues that are indicative of monopoly power be-
fore the second-tier behavioral analysis is undertaken.
In particular, some courts that have applied what is essentially the
Areeda-Turner formulation in assessing claims of predatory pricing
have recognized as relevant and important the kinds of structural char-
acteristics that would be examined in the first tier of our proposed
analysis. These courts have modified the Areeda-Turner rule by view-
ing below-cost pricing as a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for
establishing a prima facie case of predatory pricing.110 Specifically, in
each of these recent cases, the court has recognized the importance of
asking whether high barriers to entry existed and hence whether an
exception to the below-average variable cost rule was warranted.
For example, although the Fifth Circuit in International Air In-
dustries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.'"' drew heavily on the Areeda-
Turner analysis of predatory pricing and, in particular, on the average
variable cost version of their rule,'"2 it recognized the possible need
for an exception to the Areeda-Turner rule when entry barriers are
high. 113 The International Air Industries decision has provided the
foundation for the view that either of two conditions is sufficient to
prove predatory pricing: pricing below average variable cost; or pric-
ing above average variable cost, but below the short-run profit-maxi-
108. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526
F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v. CBS
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 832, 836 (C.D. Cal. 1978). In these cases, the courts considered only two
extra factors: the market share distribution of nondominant firms and the control the
dominant firm had over markets related to the market focused on in the case. In
Borden, Inc., [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21.490, the Federal Trade Commission
considered several, but not all, of the factors that we believe should be considered in
addition to simple market share data. See id. at 21,501-03.
109. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d
1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
110. See note 109 suPra (citing cases).
111. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
112. Id. at 723-24.
113. Id. at 724.
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mizing price, when barriers to entry are high.1 14 At the same time, the
court indicated clearly that it viewed the high-entry-barriers alternative
as an exception to the general standard of below-cost pricing rather
than as an independent test."15
A similar exception to the Areeda-Turner formulation has emerged
in the Ninth Circuit. In Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.," 6 the court cited
the International Air Industries discussion of entry barriers as support
for its own similar dual test of predation.z17 And later, the district
court in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corporation v. International Business
Machines Corporation ("Memorex")" 8 interpreted Hanson as estab-
lishing the same two tests for predation as International Air Indus-
tries had. 1 9 But the Memorex court stated,
The second test for predatory pricing should be applied only in
the limited circumstances described above [extremely high entry
barriers], and should probably be considered an exception to the
marginal or average variable cost test rather than an independent
test itself.120
An example of an approach to a predatory pricing case that con-
siders the kinds of structural characteristics we have emphasized is the
concurring opinion by Federal Trade Commission Commissioner
Pitofsky in Borden, Inc., Final Order to Cease and Desist.'2' Pitofsky
argued that in the presence of certain market-specific and firm-specific
114. The International Air court stated its test explicitly in the form of two alternative
sufficient conditions:
[I]n order to prevail as a matter of law, a plaintiff must at least show that either
(1) a competitor is charging a price below his average variable cost in the competitive
market or (2) the competitor is charging a price below its short-run, profit-maximizing
price and barriers to entry are great enough to enable the [competitor] to reap the
benefits of predation before new entry is possible.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
115. See id. at 724 n.31.
116. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
117. See id. at 1358 & n.5.
118. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
119. See id. at 431-32.
120. Id. at 432. The Memorex court found support for its view that "the exception
for a market with high barriers to entry is still recognized," id., in the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856-58 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). In the latter case, although adopting an average variable
cost rule, the court stated that, "As implied in Hanson, an across-the-board price set at
or above marginal cost should not ordinarily form the basis for an antitrust violation."
Id. at 857 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
121. [1978] TRADE REG. R P. (CCH) 21,490 at 21,517. The Commission's initial deci-
sion in the Borden case was analyzed extensively and cogently by Professor Schmalensee.
See Schmalensee, supra note 3, at 998-1043. Our discussion focuses on the Commission's
final decision.
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structural features, a rule that draws the line between reasonable and
unreasonably exclusionary pricing at average variable cost is defi-
cient.1 22 He argued that because of its past expenditures on image
advertising and promotion, Borden enjoyed a pronounced consumer
preference and brand loyalty advantage that would not be taken into
account by an average variable cost rule. 123 Pitofsky proposed instead
that Borden should have been allowed to reduce its price only to
average total cost because "[u]nder this standard, the monopolist would
be able to respond selectively to competitive challenges down to its
level of average full cost, but ordinarily would not be able to drive
an equally efficient challenger out of the market."'
24
The point we wish to emphasize about Pitofsky's analysis is not the
particular rule he applied in this case but his focus on structural fea-
tures of the market in formulating that rule. Pitofsky explained that
he was departing from the Areeda-Turner approach because "pro-
nounced consumer brand loyalty is a barrier to entry,"'125 that may
enable dominant firms to engage in predatory pricing without setting
price below average variable cost.
Although the cases just discussed evidence concern about the struc-
tural characteristics on which the first tier of our approach focuses,
the approach we propose differs in an important way from the analyses
in these cases. The opinions we have cited view the issue of entry
barriers as arising only in exceptional cases and, therefore, give it
secondary consideration. In sharp contrast, under our approach an
evaluation of structural characteristics is essential to a determination
of whether monopoly power exists. Every case would begin with an
inquiry into the structural characteristics of the defendant firm and
the market in which it operates that would be broader in scope than
the kind of examination undertaken in the cases mentioned above.
Evidence concerning the relationship between the firm's price and
some measure of its costs, which is central to the general rule adopted
by the courts whose opinions we have reviewed, would be introduced
only in cases that reached the second tier under our approach, those in
which structural characteristics could sustain an argument that a mo-
nopoly problem exists in the market. In contrast, a court applying a
cost-based rule with a high-entry-barrier exception would examine the
relationship between the defendant firm's price and its cost in every
case brought before it. Moreover, since under our approach the behav-
122. See Borden, Inc., [1978] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 at 21,521-22, 21,524.
123. See id. at 21,521-22.
124. See id. at 21,523.
125. See id. at 21,524.
Vol. 89: 213, 1979
HeinOnline -- 89 Yale L.J. 268 1979-1980
Predatory Pricing
ioral analysis is undertaken only when structural features indicate
that monopoly conditions are of genuine concern, neither the average
variable cost standard nor the short-run marginal cost standard is ap-
propriate for deciding whether pricing behavior has been predatory.
Instead, as we have indicated, a much more expansive rule-of-reason
approach to pricing behavior is appropriate for structuring the second-
tier behavioral inquiry. 126
The decisions in which courts have adopted the average variable
cost standard, noted the high-entry-barriers "exception," and concluded
that it did not pertain to the specific case, would have looked quite
different under our approach. In each such case, either the structural
preconditions for a proper showing of monopoly power were lacking
or the court erred in its conclusion about the importance of entry
barriers. In the absence of difficult entry conditions or similarly con-
ducive structural features of the market, long-run monopoly power is
unlikely. Hence, predatory pricing would be irrational and thus im-
probable. Therefore, if there were not significant entry barriers, and
no other structural evidence was presented that pointed to a monopoly
problem, the case should have been dismissed on structural grounds
alone. If, on the other hand, the market's structural characteristics
implied the existence or prospect of long-run monopoly power, then
the exception was relevant, and the court should have looked beyond
average variable cost in deciding the issue.127
126. While the more expansive rule-of-reason analysis of pricing behavior in the
second stage of our approach necessarily entails a more detailed and more resource-
consuming investigation than would application of a per se cost-based rule, for the
reasons discussed above, see pp. 238-39, 242-43 supra, we believe that such an inquiry is re-
quired. Cf. ANTITRUsT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 143 ("some degree of com-
plexity in antitrust litigation, where it is due to the generality or breadth of the ap-
plicable legal standards, in many cases may be necessary and desirable").
It is interesting to note a parallel between our proposed approach to predatory pricing
cases and the approach Professor Richard Posner suggests for determining the legality of
restrictions on distribution imposed by a producer. Motivated by Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), in which the Supreme Court rejected the rule
that nonprice restrictions on dealer competition are illegal per se when imposed in sales
contracts, Posner proposes a three-stage inquiry for determining the legality of both price
and nonprice restrictions on distribution. See Posner, supra note 54, at 20. In the first
stage of his inquiry Posner would ask whether a restriction embraces "so large a fraction
of the market as to make cartelization a plausible motivation for the restriction." Id. at
19. If not, Posner believes the restriction should be held lawful without proceeding to
the other two stages where specific scrutiny of firm behavior would take place. Id. We do
not wish to enter into a discussion of the merits of Posner's proposal but want to point
out that it, like our proposed approach, places the question of structural characteristics
first. The inquiry moves on to a more detailed examination of firm behavior and its
consequences only if the structural characteristics generate, in our terms, a reasonable
expectation that cartelization is a possible motivation.
127. As a final note, our approach is consistent with the view of the National Com-
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Conclusion
Although there are significant differences among recent contribu-
tions to the literature on the law and economics of antitrust, at least
two common themes are apparent. The first is that courts have been
turning more to economic principles and relying more on economic
analysis in reaching their decisions. The second recurrent theme is that
if legal decisionmakers are going to "use economics" in coming to
their conclusions, it is important that they apply economic analysis in
a correct and consistent way. Judges, juries, and commissioners decid-
ing antitrust cases not only must understand the particular conclusions
that have emerged from the law-and-economics literature, but also must
recognize the situations in which particular "rules" should be applied,
and then apply them correctly.
In this Article, we have tried to develop a framework that yields a
better appreciation and understanding of the appropriate place for
each of the several rules or standards that have been proposed for
application in predatory pricing cases. We believe that the decision-
theoretic framework we have proposed for evaluating alternative preda-
tory pricing rules can serve equally well as a mode of analyzing alterna-
tive rules in other areas of antitrust. Though only actually under-
taking such analyses will decide the issue, we believe that the decision-
theoretic framework would suggest the same kind of two-tier struc-
turalist implementation of a rule-of-reason approach in these other
areas as we were led to in the case of predatory pricing.
mission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. In its recent report, the Com-
mission states:
It is appropriate to inquire into the structure of the market, the defendant's market
power, and similar indicia of ability to monopolize when the defendant's conduct
is competitively ambiguous, that is, "when it might promote efficiency and competi-
tion under some circumstances, restrain competition under others, or be com-
pletely neutral in others." These factors will greatly affect the conduct's impact on
competition. In such cases, the need to show a dangerous probability of monopoliza-
tion should prevent Section 2 from being used to curtail legitimate competitive
behavior.
ANTrrRusT COMMISSION REroRT, supra note 20, at 148, quoting Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 12, United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 429 U.S. 1122 (1977), denying cert. to
537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
A price reduction is precisely the type of "competitively ambiguous" act to which the
Commission refers; for this reason our focus on structure first and behavior second is the
appropriate approach for deciding allegations of predatory pricing.
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